



In recent years the United States Supreme Court has em-
ployed a conclusive presumption analysis as one method of
adjudicating cases involving fifth or fourteenth amendment
claims.' The doctrine proscribes certain laws and regulations
that place individuals in disadvantageous categories without giv-
ing them some opportunity to demonstrate that they do not
belong there,2 but does not reach the question whether the un-
derlying categorization is itself unconstitutional.
This limited, procedural reach of the test may have ap-
pealed to many of the Justices in some potential equal protection
cases; protective procedural requirements generally do not re-
strict government actions with the finality attending a substantive
constitutional invalidation. Further, as the Court moved toward
an increasingly flexible-if open ended--"new reasonableness"
approach to substantive equal protection adjudication, 3 the con-
clusive presumption analysis may have appeared to provide a
more manageable basis for review.
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1 See, e.g., Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (per
curiam); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973);
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
2 See text accompanying notes 35-110 infra.
' See text accompanying notes 75-82 infra. For discussions of this more flexible
equal protection analysis applied by the Supreme Court, see Gunther, The Supreme Court
1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972); Lefcoe, The Public Housing Referendum
Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59 CAL. L. REV. 1384 (1971); Note, Boraas v. Village
of Belle Terre: The New, New Equal Protection, 72 MIcH. L. REV. 508 (1974); Note, Legisla-
tive Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:761
Critics, however, called attention to troublesome problems. 4
Some charged that the full procedural reach of the conclusive
presumption doctrine would paralyze legislatures and agencies
by destroying their ability to administer programs economically. 5
Others criticized the doctrine as providing procedural masks for
substantive rulings.6 Even when the doctrine is recognized as
an expression of procedural due process, the question arises
whether, under a conclusive presumption review, the absence of
an individualized factfinding process in establishing or applying
a generalized legislative classification always will render a law
vulnerable to a procedural challenge.7 Might not laws generally
accepted as legitimate, such as minimum age requirements for
driving or mandatory retirement age laws, succumb to this po-
tentially expansive doctrine?
Eventually, these concerns impressed the Court sufficiently
to permit Justice Rehnquist, in Weinberger v. Salfi,8 to author a
majority opinion claiming that all the conclusive presumption
cases actually had been decided on other grounds. Within five
months of Justice Rehnquist's repudiation of the doctrine, how-
ever, a six-member majority again made use of conclusive pre-
sumption analysis in Turner v. Department of Employment Security.9
Only Justice Rehnquist dissented on the merits.' Turner seems
to assure the doctrine a measure of permanence while providing
a basis for limiting the reach of conclusive presumption review."
It does not, however, answer all questions concerning the doctri-
nal status of conclusive presumption analysis. Indeed, it may
complicate matters by appearing to merge substantive and pro-
cedural due process principles.
12
This Article will examine the procedural and substantive
See Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term-Foreward: Toward a Model of Roles in the
Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 n.41, 49 n.224 (1973); Note, The
Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974);
Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72 MICH. L.
REV. 800 (1974); Comment, Constitutional Law: Court Substitutes Conclusive Presumption
Approach for Equal Protection Analysis, 58 MINN. L. REV. 965 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable
Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975).
See, e.g., Comment, supra note 4, at 976-77.
6 See, e.g., Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?,
supra note 4, at 823-24.
7 But see text accompanying notes 169-71, 221-73 infra.
8 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
9 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (per curiam).
" Id. at 47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" See text accompanying notes 67-70 infra.
12 See text accompanying notes 72-86 infra.
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issues raised by the conclusive presumption decisions, focusing
the discussion on two central themes. It will first identify the
basic characteristics of adjudicatory decisionmaking and explain
how the procedural safeguards already applied to agency ad-
judications can and should be extended to certain statutory and
administrative classifications that function as conclusive pre-
sumptions. This analysis, which assays the highlights of the Su-
preme Court's procedural due process rulings, will be based
more on the legislative and administrative factors that define a
governmental decision as "adjudicatory" than on the customary
due process code language of protected "property" and "liberty"
interests.
Secondly, this Article will propose a manageable and coher-
ent procedural doctrine for analyzing conclusive presumption
claims and demonstrate that such a doctrine has major opera-
tional significance. An assessment of the Court's recent for-
mulation of conclusive presumption theory, which uses "new
reasonableness" principles to invalidate certain conclusive pre-
sumptions, reveals a formula for review that is inadequate for
remedying all unnecessary and unfair conclusive presumptions.
A serviceable and restrained procedural doctrine, however, can
achieve proper utilization of fair procedures in conclusive pre-
sumption cases that would not be reached by an alternative new
reasonableness review.
I. A PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS FOUNDATION FOR
CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION ANALYSIS
A. The Elements of Adjudication
The origin of the procedural analysis that has shaped the
development of the conclusive presumption doctrine lies in fed-
eral court decisions reviewing adjudicative practices by adminis-
trative agencies. 13 Once an interpretation of general application
for a particular legal standard is announced, the final decision
on whether a party receives or keeps a government benefit rests
on a finding of fact, relatively unaffected by discretionary policy
judgments. An agency adjudicates when it applies discrete cri-
"3See generally 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 7.01-.20 (1958 &
Supp. 1970); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE 70's §§ 7.00-.11 (1976); Friendly,
"Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1267-70 (1975); Pederson, Formal
Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 38-44 (1975); Note, Procedural Due
Process in Government-Subsidized Housing, 86 HARV. L. REV. 880, 897-98, n.89.
19771
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:761
teria contained in existing statutory or agency standards to the
facts it has gathered. When such an adjudicatory situation is
identified, principles of due process require the use of fair pro-
cedures in the application of the relevant legal criteria.
To apply the protective principles of procedural due process
to adjudicatory proceedings, the Court has spoken in terms of
protected "liberty" and "property" interests. Under this analysis,
an interest is protected only if it constitutes a legal "entitle-
ment"14 or is the result of a "legitimate reliance."15 The legisla-
14 E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (welfare benefits characterized
as statutory entitlements).
15 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), provides an example of a protected
property interest. In Perry, the Supreme Court held that Sindermann was entitled to a
hearing prior to his dismissal as a teacher if he could demonstrate that he enjoyed de
facto tenure status by virtue of his eleven years of teaching. Id. at 594, 599, 600. To
dismiss a tenured teacher-that is, one who had an "entitlement" to remain on the
faculty-the college that had been employing him would be obligated to "show cause"
for his dismissal. Id. at 602-03. The obligation to make such a showing, requiring find-
ings of fact, presents an adjudicatory situation.
On the other hand, when confronted with a discharged employee who could claim
no entitlement to a factual determination, the Court did not call for due process pro-
tections. In Board of Regents of State College v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Su-
preme Court allowed a state college to terminate a one year teaching appointment
after the teacher's first year at the college without holding a predismissal hearing or
providing other procedural safeguards. Unlike Sindermann, Roth could claim no ten-
ured status. The Court therefore considered the new employee rehiring decision raised
in Roth to be a proper subject for discretionary decisionmaking.
In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Court cited "legitimate reliance"
as the basis for requiring the government to use protective procedures prior to the
termination of a liberty interest. Chief Justice Burger observed that a parolee facing
revocation "has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if
he fails to live up to the parole conditions." Id. at 482. To make such a demonstration
of nonadherence to parole standards, fact finding is necessary.
The Supreme Court in Roth also indicated that individuals are entitled to fair pro-
cedures prior to certain governmental actions that deprive them of liberty interests de-
fined in terms of community standing and ability to find employment. 408 U.S. at 573.
In these cases, it is a governmental charge of wrongful conduct or a governmental
action raising the implication of such wrongful conduct that harms the liberty interest
in reputation. Although a requirement of fair factfinding would avoid or minimize the
improper imposition of reputational damage, the Court has limited its procedural pro-
tection to certain especially onerous forms of reputational damage. See, e.g., Paul v.
Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1158-66 (1976). Since reputational damage is caused by an osten-
sibly objective determination of fact by a government, the Court could have charac-
terized all governmentally caused reputational damage as "protected" and then applied
a balancing test to limit procedural requirements to the more serious forms of reputa-
tional harm. Instead, the Court apparently is saying that an individual whose reputation
is at stake can justifiably expect the government to employ fair factfinding procedures
only if the government's actions will invite the imposition of especially harsh community
sanctions. See 408 U.S. at 572-75; Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. at 1166.
In Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976), the Court reduced the scope of the
protected liberty interest identified in Roth by refusing to require procedural safeguards
when the governmental entity involved does not disclose publicly the reasons for an
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tive and agency programs that give rise to entitlements and re-
liance are those that employ the kind of discrete criteria that call
for individualized factfinding. By identifying interests that qual-
ify for procedural protection in this way, the Court has tailored
the scope of its due process doctrine to fit those situations in
which factfinding, not discretionary policy judgment, governs
the allocation and continuation of a government benefit;' 6 that
is, those situations involving some form of adjudicatory deci-
sionmaking.
Typical of the kind of statutory provision that is subject to
the fair adjudication requirement is one providing that a gov-
ernment employee may be dismissed only for "cause." Such a
provision was at issue in Arnett v. Kennedy,' 7 in which six Justices,
three concurring in the result and three dissenting,' 8 agreed that
although a full trial-type hearing was not required, fair factfind-
ing procedures were prerequisites to a final government decision
to terminate employment.
The identification of a protected interest in Arnett is espe-
cially impressive because the applicable statute detailed specific
procedures for the government to apply when dismissing an
employee for cause. For Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justice Stewart, the statute's inclusion of specific
procedures foreclosed any further judicial consideration of the
fair process question.' 9 Justice Rehnquist concluded that a gov-
ernment employee has no right to more expansive employment
termination procedures than those prescribed by statute. Under
this analysis, statutorily specified procedures condition the na-
ture of the property or liberty interest created by the statute.
employee dismissal. Even if the government's reasons were based on false information
and were potentially damaging to the employee's reputation, nondisclosure would pre-
clude such damage, according to the Court. Therefore, no constitutionally protected
liberty interest was infringed upon. Id. at 2080. See also Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155
(1976); The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. RE v. 56, 86-104 (1976).
16 In addition to Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents of
State College v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972),
Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), provides a clear example of such a situation.
In Goldberg, the Supreme Court ordered a hearing for welfare recipients prior to
termination of their welfare aid. Under the Social Security Act, eligible individuals are
entitled to welfare benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1970); see Townsend v. Swank, 404
U.S. 282 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). Since the welfare program involves
categorical aid, with termination contingent on nonadherence to particular program
conditions, a termination proceeding clearly is an adjudicatory affair.
" 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
iS See text accompanying notes 19-21 infra.
" 416 U.S. at 151-52.
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Six members of the Arnett Court rejected this conception of
due process." They focused instead on the statute's creation of a
government benefit tied to objectively ascertainable facts. At the
core of this approach is the principle that when application of a
statutory benefit category calls for objective factfinding, due
process demands an appropriate measure of procedural fairness
in determining the relevant facts-regardless of the procedures
created by the statute granting the benefit.2 1 The six disagreed
on the "appropriate" measure in the case before them; three
found the statutory procedures adequate,
22 three did not.23
A primary virtue of the six-Justice plurality approach in
Arnett is that it forces a legislature to grapple directly with the
decision whether to allocate government benefits in accordance
with relatively objective factual determinations or instead by
more open-ended, discretionary judgments. At the same time,
this approach does not unduly confine legislative action. If a
legislature decides that public officials should be free to make
certain decisions without adhering to fair, and perhaps confin-
ing, factfinding procedures, it can authorize more discretionary
standards for decisionmaking.24 A legislature causes needless
confusion and frustration, however, when it provides for the
apportionment and termination of government benefits on the
basis of ascertainable facts, yet authorizes the use of procedures
2"Id. at 164 (Powell and Blackmun, JJ., concurring).; id. at 171 (White, J., concur-
ring); id. at 206 (Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
21 Compare this with Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976), discussed in notes
108-10 & accompanying text infra. Bishop may suggest that the Court is moving away
from the Arnett plurality's concept of fair adjudication.
22 See 416 U.S. at 164 (Powell and Blackmun, JJ., concurring); id. at 171 (White, J.,
concurring).
23 See id. at 206 (Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall, JJ. dissenting).
24 See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
A fair adjudication analysis that focuses on entitlement and reliance should not be
viewed as approving all forms of discretionary government decisionmaking that may
accompany the creation of certain statutory and administrative categories. Where ap-
propriate to control unacceptable governmental arbitrariness, the courts can properly
direct agencies to articulate standards as the basis for allocating benefits. For example,
courts have required agency specification of standards for benefit allocations charac-
terized as follows: (1) the applicable statute has announced eligibility criteria calling for
objective factual determinations, (2) the availability of the benefit is inadequate for al-
locating it to all eligible applicants, and (3) the applicable statute admits some discre-
tionary policy judgment for rationing the limited benefit. See Holmes v. New York City
Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th
Cir. 1964). Sometimes imposition of a standards requirement on agencies could push
additional agency decisionmaking into the adjudicatory mold. See generally Board of
Regents of State College v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 587 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But
see also text accompanying notes 241-47 infra.
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that clearly are inadequate for determining those facts fairly. An
adjudicatory decision, such as employment termination, made
without any resort to fair factfinding procedures, often will ap-
pear arbitrary and unjust. Notwithstanding Justice Rehnquist's
analysis, the employee in such a case has been working under a
statutory "entitlement" that explicitly states that he can keep his
job as long as he complies with certain performance require-
ments. 25 To preclude untoward government behavior in these
cases, procedural due process should require a government to
employ fair procedures.
B. Programmatic Limitations on Procedural Safeguards
Once a court decides that an interest qualifies for due pro-
cess safeguards, it then must determine how much process is
due. In order to avoid unnecessary interference with the ad-
ministration of public programs, the courts have fashioned a
balancing test for making this latter determination. The Su-
preme Court set forth the elements to be balanced in Mathews
v. Eldridge:
2 6
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depriva-
tion of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procedural requirement would entail.
2 7
In Mathews, "due process" did not require an adjudicatory hear-
ing prior to the termination of disability benefits under the So-
cial Security Act. 28 In contrast, the Court held in Goldberg v.
Kelly29 that such an adjudicatory hearing would be required be-
fore terminating welfare benefits under the federal-state AFDC
programs.
30
Thus, viewed in conjunction, Mathews and Goldberg indicate
25 See 416 U.S. at 151-52 (opinion of Rehnquist, J.); id. at 166 (Powell, J., concur-
ring); id. at 209-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
26 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
2 7 Id. at 335.
28 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1970).
29 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1970).
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that even slight changes in context may yield varied results
under this balancing test if the relative weights of the individual
interest and governmental program needs and limitations are
perceived to be different.3 t Indeed, in some cases the courts
have accepted partial or no procedural safeguards because cer-
tain programs cannot function effectively unless procedural pro-
tection is truncated.3 2 The appeal of this balancing test is that
while substantial interests of private persons are to some degree
protected, the decision that some process is due does not neces-
sarily lead to judicial imposition of undue restrictions on the
ability of legislative and administrative bodies to construct and
administer programs.
33
"1 Three recent cases demonstrate the Supreme Court's continuing sensitivity to the
possibility that judicially mandated procedures will improperly frustrate significant pol-
icy objectives. In Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974), the six-member plurality
accepted factfinding procedures that did not include a predismissal trial-type hearing as
sufficient for dismissing an OEO nonprobationary employee. Justices Powell and
Blackmun, who cast the deciding votes, approved of the OEO's action because the
government's interest in the "maintenance of employee efficiency and discipline," id. at
168 (Powell, J., concurring), outweighed the interest of the employee in avoiding "a
temporary interruption of income." Id. at 169 (Powell, J., concurring).
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the Court required certain procedural pro-
tection for public school students prior to their suspension from school for disciplinary
reasons; but, in deference to the viable and efficient administration of the educational
facility, concluded that the full range of adjudicatory protections was not appropriate.
Similarly, in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Court sought to accom-
modate program needs with fair process by providing a limited range of procedural
protections for prisoners facing either the loss of good-time credit or solitary confine-
ment. The Court held that a prisoner was entitled to prior written notice, a written
statement of findings by the adjudicatory body, and the opportunity to call witnesses
and present documentary evidence in his own behalf, if doing so would not jeopardize
institutional safety or correctional goals. Id. at 564, 566. The Court held, however, that
the prisoner was not entitled to retained or appointed counsel, or to confront accusers
and cross-examine witnesses. Id. at 568, 570.
For more on the balancing test as it relates to programmatic constraints, see
Friendly, supra note 13, at 1278; Note, supra note 13, at 897-98.
32 The Goldberg opinion cited with approval decisions allowing agencies to take ad-
verse action without first affording basic procedural protections to those affected. 397
U.S. at 263 n.10. For example, in North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S.
306 (1908), agents of the city of Chicago, without first providing protective adjudica-
tory procedures, seized food thought to be unfit for human consumption. The Court
reasoned that if the government is to implement effectively its legitimate policy of
protecting citizens from dangerous food, time-consuming procedures before seizure
are inappropriate. For other examples of judicially approved summary action, see
Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (seizure of mislabeled vita-
min product); R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911
(1962) (suspension of exemption from stock registration requirement).
a3 This is not to suggest that the balancing test is characterized by enormous ease of
application or consistency of result. Compare Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (pre-
judgment replevin laws allowing creditors to seize chattels without first affording prior
notice and opportunity to be heard held unconstitutional), with Mitchell v. W. T. Grant
THE CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION SHUFFLE
II. THE SUPREME COURT CONCLUSIVE
PRESUMPTION DECISIONS
A. Procedural Standards for Statutory Categories
In due process terms, a statute is constitutionally defective if
it contains factfinding procedures that are inadequate for mak-
ing a factual determination that the statute requires. 34 One legis-
lative technique that may deny fair factual determinations in the
allocation of government benefits is the creation of entitlement
categories defined in part by a conclusive presumption of certain
facts. To invalidate a legislative category on conclusive presump-
tion grounds, a court must be able to identify a legislative sub-
stitution of a presumed fact for a fair determination of fact.
Thus, in the 1932 case of Heiner v. Donnan,35 the Supreme Court
characterized section 302(c) of the Revenue Act of 192636 as a
conclusive presumption. 7 The Act, which imposed an estate tax
on all gifts made in contemplation of death, provided that gifts
made within two years of the decedent's death shall "be deemed
and held to have been made in contemplation of death. '38 The
Court held that this provision violated due process because "it
constitutes an attempt by legislative fiat, to enact into existence a
fact which here does not, and cannot be made to, exist in actual-
ity .... ,,39 The Court had no difficulty concluding that Congress
had attempted to avoid a fair factfinding process because the
statute expressly announced that the challenged provision was
designed to serve as a surrogate for individualized factual de-
terminations.
Conclusive presumption adjudication began in earnest in
Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (procedure permitting trial judge to order sequestration of
property without granting prior notice and opportunity to be heard held constitu-
tional). The four dissenters in Grant, Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Mar-
shall-members of the Fuentes majority-were unable to perceive any constitutionally
significant differences between the procedures involved in the two cases. 416 U.S. at
629-36 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Inherent in the use of a flexible balancing test is the
possibility that a changed Court majority will seize upon a slight factual difference to
justify a result at variance with previous decisions. Such a change in the personnel on
the Court may explain the movement from Fuentes to Mitchell and from Goldberg to
Matthews. See id. at 635.
'4 See notes 26-33 supra & accompanying text.
35 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
36 Ch. 27, 44 Stat. 70 (1926) (current version at I.R.C. § 2035(b)).
37 285 U.S. at 324.
38 Ch. 27, 44 Stat. 70 (1926).
39 285 U.S. at 329.
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1971. In Bell v. Burson4 11 the Supreme Court examined legisla-
tive purpose to determine whether certain statutory provisions
were designed to avoid fair factual determind.tions. Bell involved
a Georgia statute requiring uninsured motorists involved in au-
tomobile accidents either to secure a release from liability or post
security in the amount of damages claimed against them. 41 Re-
gardless of whether there was any evidence that the driver would
be held liable, the statute mandated the suspension of an unin-
sured motorist's license if he or she failed to comply with its
security requirements. 4' Georgia argued that a hearing on the
question of possible liability was unnecessary because fault and
liability were not part of the statutory scheme. 43 This defense
failed. Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan stated:
'[W]e look to substance, not to bare form, to determine
whether constitutional minimums have been honored.'
...And looking to the operation of the State's statu-
tory scheme, it is clear that liability, in the sense of an
ultimate judicial determination of responsibility, plays a
crucial role in the Safety Responsibility Act. If prior to
suspension there is a release from liability executed by
the injured party, no suspension is worked by the Act.
. . .Thus, we are not dealing here with a no-fault
scheme.44
The Court then ordered Georgia to provide "a forum for the
determination of the question whether there is a reasonable pos-
sibility of a judgment being rendered against [the licensee] as a
result of the accident.
45
Subsequently, the Supreme Court invalidated other statu-
tory schemes as establishing conclusive presumptions in violation
of procedural due process. In Stanley v. Illinois,46 the Court re-
jected Illinois' conclusive statutory presumption that unwed
fathers are unfit to raise their children.47 Then, in Vlandis v.
Kline, 48 the Court overturned Connecticut's statutory definition
40402 U.S. 535 (1971).
41 GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-605 (1973).
42 402 U.S. at 536-37.
43402 U.S. at 541.
41 Id. (citations omitted).
45 Id. at 542.
46 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
4
7 Id. at 647-50, 653-54 n.5.
48 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
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of residency used to charge out-of-state residents attending
Connecticut public colleges tuition and fees higher than those
charged in-state residents. The Court found that the Connec-
ticut statute improperly created the conclusive presumption that
students who had recently lived out of state were not Connec-
ticut residents at any time during their Connecticut college edu-
cation. Two weeks after deciding Vlandis, the Court struck down
section 5(b) of the Food Stamp Act49 in United States Department of
Agriculture v. Mur'. 5" The Court there held that section 5(b)
created the conclusive presumption that households are not
needy if they "contain persons 18 years or older who have been
claimed as 'dependents' for federal income tax purposes by tax-
payers who are themselves ineligible for food stamp relief."51 At
the end of this conclusive presumption invalidation spree, in
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,52 the Court, citing its
fresh precedents, held that school boards may not conclusively
presume that a woman entering her fourth or fifth month of
pregnancy is physically unable to teach. Similarly, the Court re-
jected rules conclusively presuming that after giving birth a
woman will not be physically able to resume teaching until a
specified number of months have passed.
B. A Procedural Retreat
Although LaFleur extended the string of conclusive pre-
sumption decisions, it also revealed that Justice Powell had
abandoned his support for that mode of analysis. Concurring
on equal protection grounds,53 he announced that he had be-
come persuaded by the objections to the conclusive presumption
doctrine raised by Justice Rehnquist in dissent.54 Apparently,
other early supporters of the doctrine also began to share Justice
Powell's concerns, for in Weinberger v. Salfi55 Justice Rehnquist
was able to speak for the Court in an opinion that repudiated
conclusive presumption analysis.
In Salfi, the widow of a heart attack victim, who had died
less than six months after their marriage, challenged the denial
49 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (1970), as amended by 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (Supp. V 1975).
so 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
511d. at 511.
52 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
531 Id. at 651 (Powell, J., concurring).
.4 Id. at 652.
5s 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
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of social security benefits to herself and her daughter by a previ-
ous marriage. The Social Security Act provides insurance ben-
efits for the spouse and children of a deceased wage earner only
if they were related to the wage earner for at least nine months
prior to the insured's death. 56 The Secretary of HEW defended
this limitation as a means for preventing payments to the sur-
vivors of sham marriages that were consummated only for the
purpose of creating social security insurance beneficiaries. 57 The
Court, having accepted this rationale for the provision,5 8 easily
could have followed the district court's invalidation of the du-
ration requirement as a conclusive presumption. 59 A six-mem-
ber majority, however, upheld the nine-month requirement.
For Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, categories ef-
fected by laws creating conclusive presumptions are to be
judged by the standards applied to other legislative classifica-
tions; in most cases that standard is a reasonableness test.60 In
applying that test in Salfi, although he recognized that the chal-
lenged provision was designed to avoid individualized deter-
minations and would exclude some bona fide claimants, Justice
Rehnquist concluded that "Congress could rationally choose to
adopt such a course."'61 Further, he feared that adherence to
51 42 U.S.C. § 416(c) & (e) (Supp. V 1975).
57 422 U.S. at 776-77.
58 Id. at 780.
-9 Salfi v. Weinberger, 373 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd 422 U.S. 749
(1975). The Act's legislative history supports this interpretation of the nine-month re-
quirement. See 422 U.S. at 777-80.
60 422 U.S. at 776-77.
61Id. at 781. It is not surprising that Justice Rehnquist would be in the forefront of
an effort to discard the conclusive presumption doctrine. In Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974), he had attempted unsuccessfully to reduce the reach of procedural due
process. See text accompanying note 19 supra. Moreover, he had consistently opposed
the Court's conclusive presumption decisions. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632, 657 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States Dep't of Agriculture
v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 522 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441, 463 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Typifying the spirit of his position is
the following excerpt from his dissent in LaFleur:
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE pointed out in his dissent last year in Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, "literally thousands of state statutes create classifications
permanent in duration, which are less than perfect, as all legislative classifica-
tions are, and might be improved on by individualized determinations ......
Id., at 462. Hundreds of years ago in England, before Parliament came to be
thought of as a body having general law making power, controversies were
determined on an individualized basis without benefit of general law. Most
students of government consider the shift from this sort of determination,
made on an ad hoc basis by the King's representative, to a relatively uniform
body of rules enacted by a body exercising legislative authority, to have been a
significant step forward in the achievement of a civilized political society. It
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an individualized-determination rule in Salfi would turn the con-
clusive presumption doctrine "into a virtual engine of destruc-
tion for countless legislative judgments which have heretofore
been thought wholly consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.
62
Justice Rehnquist argued that the prior conclusive presump-
tion rulings actually were decided on other grounds. He cited an
"essential" interest in child rearing to explain Stanley63 and re-
ferred to constitutional protections for "matters of marriage and
family life" to justify the holding in LaFleur.64 He attributed the
invalidations of the food stamp eligibility requirement in Murry
to a determination that there was no rational relationship be-
tween the eligibility criteria and any legitimate legislative goal.
65
He made no mention of Bell, and encountered considerable dif-
ficulty in distinguishing Vlandis.
66
C. Merging Procedure with Substance-
A Doctrinal Consolidation?
Justice Rehnquist's effort to expunge the conclusive pre-
sumption doctrine was undermined, however, in Turner v. De-
partment of Employment Security,67 a per curiam ruling that again
included conclusive presumption analysis. At issue was a Utah
statute rendering all pregnant women ineligible for unemploy-
ment benefits for a period starting twelve weeks before the ex-
pected date of childbirth and extending six weeks afterwards.
68
The Court viewed the law as creating an invalid conclusive pre-
seems to me a little late in the day for this Court to weigh in against such an
established consensus.
414 U.S. at 657-58 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62 422 U.S. at 772. See generally text accompanying notes 4-8 supra.
63 422 U.S. at 771 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66Justice Rehnquist characterized the holding in Vlandis in procedural terms:
"[W]here Connecticut purported to be concerned with residency, it might not at the
same time deny to one seeking to meet its test of residency the opportunity to show
factors clearly bearing on that issue." Id. at 771. Perhaps Justice Rehnquist acknowl-
edged the procedural basis for the Vlandis holding because of the form of the statute at
issue. Because the statute expressly stated that determination of the residency of college
applicants was its purpose, the procedure-avoidance objective was difficult to ignore.
Although Justice Rehnquist's Safi opinion rejects the conclusive presumption doctrine,
his treatment of Vlandis might suggest an approval of conclusive presumption analysis
for those easy cases in which the procedural objective of a challenged statute is explicit.
See text accompanying notes 118-31 infra.
67 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (per curiam).
68 UTAH CODE ANN. § 3-4-5(h)(1) (1974).
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sumption because many women are in fact able to work during
much of the statutory period.69
Turner suggests a restraining principle for conclusive pre-
sumption analysis: the requirement of individualized fact finding
is triggered by the implication of a vital human interest. More
clearly than in any previous opinion relying on the theory of
conclusive presumptions, the Court tied the need for individ-
ualized determination to the identification of a constitutionally
preferred interest-in Turner, the right to bear children. Said the
Court: "The Fourteenth Amendment require[s] that unemploy-
ment compensation boards.., must achieve legitimate state ends
through more individualized means when basic human liberties
are at stake.
70
Procedural due process cases often have assessed the impor-
tance of the individual interest adversely affected by a chal-
lenged procedure, 71 an assessment represented by a court's bal-
ancing the individual interest affected against the government's
interest in employing an abbreviated procedure.72 Similarly,
Supreme Court conclusive presumption decisions-even before
Turner-had used language suggesting that substantive concerns
were behind the results. Thus, in Stanley, the Court expressed its
strong concern with preserving family integrity, 73 while in
LaFleur, it noted that "freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause.
74
The equal protection overtones of these two decisions are
consistent with the emergence in recent years of an equal protec-
tion analysis marked by increased flexibility. 75 A "new reason-
ableness" test has made inroads on the more rigid two-tiered
approach that either permissively accepts a classification justified
by "some rational basis" n76 or, alternatively, virtually assures in-
validation by requiring a "compelling state interest" justifica-
tion.7 7 When the Court has applied its new reasonableness test
69 423 U.S. at 46.
70 
Id.
71 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970).
72 See text accompanying notes 26-33 supra.
73 405 U.S. at 651.
74 414 U.S. at 639.
75 See note 3 supra & accompanying text.
76 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
77 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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for reviewing legislative classifications, the identification of an
important value that is threatened has triggered a somewhat
heavier burden of governmental justification, though not the
compelling state interest justification required under the strin-
gent suspect classification 78 or fundamental interest 79 stan-
dards. Consequently, the Stanley focus on family integrity and
the "precious" right to raise one's own children 80 suggests the
possibility that a new reasonableness review was applied. The
challenged practice in LaFleur centered on issues concerning
childbearing-a "vital area of . . .constitutional liberty."81 Al-
though neither the classification made nor the interest affected
triggered the compelling interest standard of review in LaFleur,
the Court appeared to apply a new reasonableness review as it
concluded that there was no rational relationship between the
state's goal of instructional continuity and the means employed
to achieve it.
8 2
It is not surprising that the childbearing interest at issue in
LaFleur and Turner-as well, perhaps, as the child-rearing inter-
est at issue in Stanley-triggered a new reasonableness review.
These issues are closely related to questions involving sex dis-
crimination, which have been attracting much of the Court's
attention of late.83 The Court has attempted to redress griev-
ances associated with sex classifications without ruling that such
governmental distinctions are subject to the stringent suspect
classification review standard.
8 4
The limited conclusive presumption doctrine suggested by
Turner would furnish the Court with a helpful addition to its new
reasonableness test. In cases involving constitutionally preferred
interests that do not warrant a fundamental interest/suspect clas-
sification review, the Court can require fair adjudication to pro-
tect the important interests in question. In the language of equal
protection, this approach represents the maximum remedy for
78 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
7 9 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
80405 U.S. at 651 (quoting May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953)).
81 414 U.S. at 640.
8
2 Id. at 640-43.
83 See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
84 See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). In part, the Court may fear that
introduction of the suspect classification test into these cases will frustrate what it con-
siders to be remedial legislation. See text accompanying notes 270-75 infra.
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correcting undesired over- and underinclusiveness.85 For cases
involving sex classification, the individualized approach is espe-
cially appropriate because the Court has attacked certain sex
distinctions as constituting unfair and inaccurate stereotypes.
86
At the same time, this application of Turner-approaching con-
clusive presumption analysis from the perspective of current
equal protection or substantive due process theory-is consistent
with the Salfi rejection of fair adjudication theory as the primary
basis for invoking the doctrine.
The predecessor of the analysis just suggested is Jimenez v.
Weinberger.8 7 Jimenez involved section 216(h) of the Social Se-
curity Act,8 8 which denied disability benefits to a certain class of
illegitimate dependents born after a wage earner became dis-
abled. Under that section and section 202(d)(3)(A),8 9 an illegiti-
mate child born after the disability has been sustained qualifies
for benefits only if under state law the child is allowed to inherit
from the wage earner,9" the illegitimacy resulted from "formal,
nonobvious defects in [the] parents' ceremonial marriage,"9' or
the child has been "legitimated in accordance with state law."
92
Illegitimates falling into any one of these categories could receive
benefits without any showing of actual 'dependency; all others
were denied benefits regardless of actual dependency. This ex-
clusionary rule was defended as a means of preventing spuri-
ous benefit claims by illegitimate children not genuinely depen-
dent on a disabled parent.
93
Conceding the legitimacy of this objective, 94 Chief Justice
Burger, speaking for an eight-member majority, concluded that
the statutory exclusion of some after-born illegitimate children
constituted a denial of equal protection because no rational basis
existed for the distinction between the two classes of illegit-
imates. 95 The exclusionary category made the Act underinclu-
sive: some dependent children were excluded. Conversely, the
other category made the Act overinclusive: some who were not
85 See, e.g., Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
86E.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
87 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
88 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (1970).
89 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3)(A) (1970).
98 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (1970).
91 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(B) (1970).
92 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) (1970).
9 417 U.S. at 635.
94 Id. at 636.
95 Id. at 636-37.
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dependent were included. "Thus," argued the Chief Justice, "the
two subclasses of illegitimates stand on equal footing, and the
potential for spurious claims is the same as to both; hence to
conclusively deny one subclass benefits presumptively available
to the other denies the former the equal protection of the laws
.... ,9. Calling for a remedy characteristic of the conclusive
presumption rulings, the Court remanded the case to afford the
plaintiffs an opportunity to demonstrate the validity of their
dependency.
97
As Justice Rehnquist observed in dissent,98 the Jimenez ma-
jority effectively applied a conclusive presumption analysis. In-
sofar as discrete dependency criteria that could be satisfied by
factual showings gave rise to a statutory entitlement to disability
benefits, 99 the majority opinion may be viewed in terms of the
procedural due process rationale of the conclusive presumption
doctrine. BecauseJimenez dealt with classifications that disadvan-
taged illegitimate children, however, its approach also can be
viewed as a first run of the new equal protection role for con-
clusive presumption analysis that was suggested by Turner. As in
Turner, theJimenez Court identified a classification that, although
not "suspect" enough to require a compelling state interest jus-
tification, was sufficiently special to require more individualized
determinations of benefits eligibility.'
The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Mathews
v. Lucas" 1 highlights the procedural analysis that the Jimenez
majority had phrased in equal protection terms. Lucas upheld
section 202(d) of the Social Security Act, 1 12 under which "de-
pendent" unmarried children are entitled to receive survivor's
benefits upon the death of a parent. A child qualifies as a de-
96 Id. at 637.
97 Id. at 637-38.
98 Id. at 639 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
9' See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
100 This approach offers the Court an escape from its uncertainty over whether to
treat illegitimacy as a suspect classification. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972) (invalidated a state workmen's compensation statute relegating un-
acknowledged illegitimate children to a lesser benefits status than that occupied by the
deceased's legitimate children); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (upheld a
Louisiana statute allowing illegitimate children to inherit only if there were no surviving
spouse or legitimate relatives); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (held that an
interpretation of a Louisiana wrongful death statute denying recovery to illegitimate
children invidiously discriminated against the illegitimate children in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause).
101 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
102 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (Supp. V 1975).
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pendent if, at the time of the parent's death, the parent was
living with the child or contributing to the child's support.
103
The statute expressly presumes, however, that almost all legiti-
mate children and some categories of illegitimate children are
dependent. 104 Most illegitimate children, on the other hand,
must individually demonstrate a dependence upon the deceased
parent.
Lucas does not raise the equal protection problem of under-
inclusivenesss highlighted inJimenez. Although most illegitimate
children who satisfy the criteria of dependency do not enjoy a
presumption of eligibility, they may collect survivor's benefits by
demonstrating the requisite facts. 105 Under the provision of the
statute questioned in Jimenez, those not presumed dependent
were denied such an opportunity to demonstrate dependency.1
6
The challenged provision in Lucas, however, did present the
same overinclusiveness as that inJimenez; the Court nevertheless
held the former to be constitutional. Consistent with this result
the Jimenez remedy had addressed only the procedural inade-
quacies resulting in the statute's underinclusiveness0 7 The
primary principle that emerges from the two cases is that il-
legitimate children must be afforded the opportunity to demon-
strate their dependency when a government program generally
grants benefits to dependent children. As long as procedurally
fair access to these benefits is provided, the Court will approve a
statute also containing overinclusive categories that represent
reasonable presumptions of dependent status.
Even while the Supreme Court has expanded the applica-
tion of fair process principles in equal protection contexts, it has,
in Bishop v. Wood,' 0 8 handed down a decision that implies limi-
1,3 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) (1970).
104 See id. Illegitimate children who have not been adopted are presumed to be
dependent if they fall within one of the following categories:
(1) the child is entitled to inherit personal property from the insured parent under the
applicable state intestacy law;
(2) the deceased parent prior to death (a) had gone through a marriage ceremony with
the other parent, resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but for a
nonobvious legal defect, would have been valid, or (b) had acknowledged in writing that
the child was his, or (c) had been decreed by a court to be the child's father, or (d) had
been ordered by a court to support the child because the child was his. 427 U.S. at
498-99.
15 427 U.S. at 512.
106 See text accompanying notes 88-93 supra.
1"" See 417 U.S. at 637-38.
"Is 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
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tations for the use of procedural due process theory to pro-
scribe statutorily created conclusive presumptions. Bishop upheld
the dismissal, without due process safeguards, of a municipal
employee, even though a city ordinance seemingly stipulated
that such a dismissal could be only for "cause."'' 9 The decision
suggests that statutorily created property interests do not neces-
sarily qualify for judicially imposed due process protection if the
same statute also specifies, as permissible means for terminating
the interest, procedures for making factual determinations.
Once legislative specification of even "unfair" procedures is ac-
cepted, then legislative specification of the extreme case of in-
adequate procedure, the conclusive presumption, also becomes
respectable. Yet Turner, Jimenez, and Lucas preclude the appli-
cation of such a broad reading of Bishop to statutes involving
such sensitive areas as sex classification, child-rearing and ille-
gitimacy.""°
Although Turner in particular seems to assure a continued
though less expansive role for the conclusive presumption doc-
trine, two important questions remain, especially in the wake of
Bishop. First, is it possible to formulate a viable conclusive pre-
sumption doctrine as an extension of procedural due process?
Second, would such a doctrine address issues not reviewed satis-
factorily under other due process and equal protection prin-
ciples?
III. LIMITING PRINCIPLES INHERENT IN
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
Two principles that limit the procedural conclusive pre
sumption doctrine to manageable proportions can be distilled
1"'Id. at 342-45. Bishop does not rest comfortably next to Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134 (1974). See text accompanying notes 17-25 supra. The Court did distinguish
the two cases, however. The federal statute at issue in Arnett was construed to confer a
protected property right in continued employment. Professing deference to local court
interpretation of state and municipal law, id. at 345-47, the Bishop Court noted that
since property interests are created "by existing rules or understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law," Board of Regents of State College v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), and since the local court in Bishop-actually a federal district
court-found that under local law the employee "held his position at the will and plea-
sure of the city," id. at 345, a protected property interest was not implicated. Id.
at 347. As Justice White explained in dissent, however, the Bishop district court con-
strued the local ordinance's employment termination provisions before Arnett's explana-
tion of how such laws were to be evaluated for purposes of applying procedural
safeguards. Id. at 355 (White, J., dissenting).
11" See text accompanying notes 67-107 supra.
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from the conclusive presumption cases. The first limiting princi-
ple concerns the extent to which a legislative or administrative
provision, challenged as a conclusive presumption, pursues a
substantive policy objective. Conclusive presumption analysis
does not address policy judgments concerning reasonable non-
procedural objectives, such as the allocation of limited resources.
The second limiting principle concerns the feasibility of an indi-
vidualized determination process as a reasonable alternative to a
conclusive presumption. These doctrinal constraints are charac-
teristic of procedural due process analysis and serve to balance
procedural safeguards against legitimate program goals.
A. The Pursuit of a Procedural Objective
A court may hold a statutory classification to be a conclusive
presumption when it construes the classification as a procedural
short cut. A classification constitutes such a short cut when the
government fails to provide adequate factfinding procedures for
the termination, reduction, or denial of benefits for which eligi-
bility has been defined in terms of discrete statutory or adminis-
trative criteria. In the language of current procedural due pro-
cess doctrine, interests defined by such criteria are "protected
property or liberty interests,""' and the allocation of these in-
terests brings into play the principles announced in the adminis-
trative due process cases:1 2 the question is whether the govern-
mental decision at issue can be made only after an individualized
determination of fact."1
3
Sometimes, however, a statutory provision challenged on
procedural grounds is also subject to a substantive characteriza-
tion. In Heiner v. Donnan,1 4 for example, the provision char-
acterized as a conclusive presumption-a surrogate for a fact-
finding procedure-also can be viewed as an expression of
substantive policy. 1 5 In form, the substantive aim of the statute
11 See notes 14-15 supra & accompanying text.
112 See text accompanying notes 13-33 supra.
113 See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
114 285 U.S. 312 (1932). The case is discussed in text accompanying notes 35-39
supra.
115 With regard to conclusive presumptions, Wigmore has stated:
In strictness, there cannot be such a thing as a "conclusive presumption."
Wherever from one fact another is said to be conclusively presumed, in the
sense that the opponent is absolutely precluded from showing by any evidence
that the second fact does not exist, the rule is really providing that, where the
first fact is shown to exist, the second fact's existence is wholly immaterial for
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was to place a higher estate tax on gifts made in contemplation
of death, while procedurally it presumed that all persons dying
less than two years after making a gift made it in contemplation
of death.'1 6 One can construe this statutory scheme, however, as
creating a two-part substantive category of tax liability. By ignor-
ing the statute's form, it can be interpreted as imposing the tax
on all gifts made in contemplation of death plus all gifts made
within two years of death regardless of the donor's intentions.
Because the Court did not ignore the form of the statute,"1
7
however, it viewed its invalidation as the elimination of an unfair
process only and not as a threat to the substantive aim of the tax
statute.
A conclusive presumption doctrine that derives from prin-
ciples of procedural due process must be sensitive to the degree
to which a statute pursues legitimate substantive goals. An
analysis of the Supreme Court's conclusive presumption rulings
provides an opportunity for assaying whether the doctrine can
be responsive to varying procedural and substantive factors.
1. Laws Pursuing Only Procedural Short Cuts
a. Legislation
The procedural due process justification for the conclusive
presumption doctrine is clearest where statutory construction
reveals that the provision in question was designed to serve a
procedural purpose only. Thus, in United States Department of
Agriculture v. Murry, 1 8 the Court surveyed the legislative record
of section 5(b) of the Food Stamp Act"19 and concluded that its
substantive goal was curbing "abuses of the program by 'college
students, children of wealthy parents.' "120 The Court found that
the section's denial of food stamp eligibility to all households
containing persons 18 years or older claimed as dependents by
taxpayers who are themselves ineligible for food stamps, regard-
the purposes of the proponent's case; and to provide this is to make a rule of
substantive law, and not a rule apportioning the burden of persuading as to
certain propositions or varying the duty of coming forward with evidence.
9J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2492 (3d ed. 1940).
116 See 285 U.S. at 320.
117 See id. at 328-29.
,Is 413 U.S. 508 (1973). The case is discussed in text accompanying notes 49-51
supra.
119 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (1970).
120 413 U.S. at 513 (quoting 116 CONG. REC. 41979 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Latta).
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less of whether the dependents received sufficient outside in-
come to escape indigency, represented an effort to avoid indi-
vidualized determinations of whether tax dependents did in fact
receive substantial amounts of outside income from their well-
heeled parents'21-that is, a procedural short cut. Consequently,
invalidating section 5(b) did not preclude Congress from attain-
ing the same substantive objective by legislation that provides for
individualized determinations. Such a judicial directive to pursue
a procedural end by fair procedural means is consonant with the
fair adjudication theme developed in the procedural due process
rulings.
22
Bell v. Burson123 also invalidated a provision comfortably
construed as serving only a procedural purpose. The Georgia
legislation contested there was designed to ensure that possible
tortfeasors show, either through accident insurance or by post-
ing security, that they could provide compensation for damage
they caused. This substantive objective only required that un-
insured motorists post security when there was a reasonable
possiblity that they would be found liable for damages in the
amount claimed. Consequently, the Bell requirement that
Georgia make a determination that there is a reasonable possi-
bility that an uninsured motorist will be found liable before
depriving him of his license only serves to confine the statute's
procedural scope to its substantive objective.
The death benefits legislation in Weinberger v. Salfi1 24 also
falls into this category. The legislative history and the primary
defense asserted by HEW described the duration-of-relation
requirement as safeguarding the Social Security insurance
program from marriages designed solely to create insurance
beneficiaries.' 25 Salfi's distinction is that the Court conceded the
procedural short cut objective of the nine-month require-
ment-and then proceeded to justify it. Under a permissive re-
121 See id. at 513-14.
122 See text accompanying notes 13-33 supra. For an alternative interpretation of
Mury, see Tribe, supra note 4, at 49 n.224.
123 402 U.S. 535 (1971). The case is discussed in text accompanying notes 40-45
supra.
124 422 U.S. 749 (1975). The case is discussed in text accompanying notes 55-66,
supra.
1"I See id. at 776-85. A second defense-that the requirement served the objective
of aiding only those persons who were likely to have become dependent on the income
of the deceased wage earner-is also subject to a procedure avoidance characterization.
In any case, it was only half-heartedly presented, and the Court gave it only passing
attention. See id. at 776 n. 11.
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view standard, Justice Rehnquist concluded that Congress ra-
tionally could decide to eschew individualized determinations
and use the presumptive approach to assure proper risk man-
agement for the insurance program. 126 He also supported the
presumptive standard as a means for avoiding costly administra-
tive procedures and delays.
127
Such programmatic concerns are not alien to procedural
due process analysis. As explained above,12 8 the Court has
fashioned a balancing test for evaluating the impact of prcedural
requirements on the realization of governmental program goals.
Under that test, accommodation is possible between procedural
safeguards and program needs. Vlandis v. Kline' 29 and Mourn-
ing v. Family Publications Service, Inc. ,13" discussed below, 13' dem-
onstrate how the Court has recognized the need to address con-
clusive presumptions in a manner that is compatible with valid
program goals. Salfi, however, does not represent such a rea-
sonable balancing exercise.
b. Administrative Rules
When an administrative rule is challenged as creating a con-
clusive presumption, a reviewing court can effectively probe ad-
ministrative action to uncover a procedure-avoidance objective.
Administrative rulings often are subject to the clarifying tes-
timony of those primarily responsible for the regulation in
question. 32 For example, in the early 1970's the Department of
Housing and Urban Development became concerned about ris-
ing tenant default rates in rental projects receiving federal in-
terest subsidies and mortgage insurance. 133 On June 13, 1972,
HUD issued a policy notice, which it conceded was designed to
screen out tenants considered likely to default,' 34 that rendered
any household that would have to devote more than thirty-five
per cent of its adjusted income for rent ineligible for admission
to specified housing. In Mandina v. Lynn,' 35 a federal district
"I See id. at 776, 780.
127 See id. at 781-85.
128 See text accompanying notes 26-33 supra.
129 412 U.S. 441 (1973). The case is discussed in text accompanying note 48 supra.
13" 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
131 See text accompanying notes 204-13 infra.
132 See, e.g., Findrilakis v. Secretary of Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 357 F.
Supp. 547, 550 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
133 See id.
134 See 37 Fed. Reg. 11758 (1972).
135 357 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
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court invalidated the HUD policy notice as creating an illegal
conclusive presumption. Mandina required HUD to afford an
applicant the opportunity to reverse the established presump-
tion-such as by showing a history of reliable rent payment at a
rent-income ratio above the thirty-five percent criterion.
136
2. Spurious Claims of Substantive Objectives
Although courts are accustomed to determining statutory
purpose in order to decide how a statute should operate, 137
when challengers of a statute claim that its objectives should be
examined to ascertain whether the underlying goal is impermis-
sible, courts frequently have declined to investigate on the tradi-
tional ground that judicial inquiry into legislative "motive" is
improper. 38 Nevertheless, when the Supreme Court has deter-
mined that a challenged provision was designed to serve an un-
fair procedural purpose, judicial restraint has not stopped it
from invalidating the provision as an impermissible conclusive
presumption. 39 This form of judicial reversal is apparently
more acceptable to the Court than other "impermissible pur-
pose" invalidations, because a legislature can enact procedur-
ally adequate legislation that still will achieve its substantive
objective.
411
Reviewing courts, however, may be offered substantive ob-
jectives, invented to short-circuit procedural challenges, for pro-
visions that appear to pursue procedural goals. Identification of
a procedural purpose has been relatively easy in most of the
recent conclusive presumption cases. The Stanley, LaFleur, Salfi,
and Turner defendants volunteered procedural defenses, among
"
6 
Id. at 278-79. In addition, the Mandina court found that, using a correct formu-
lation of the basic rental costs under the statute, "the plaintiff clearly is able to pay the
basic rent with not more than thirty-five percent of his adjusted income as required by
this Circular and thus he qualifies for membership in . .. the housing in question." 357
F. Supp. at 276. As an alternative ground of invalidation, the court held that the is-
suance of the policy notice violated the procedural requirements for the publication of
department rules and regulations contained in 24 C.F.R. § 10.5 (1976).
137 See Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1205, 1212-14 (1970). See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANrEROUS BRANCH (1962).
13See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Ely, supra note 137.
139 See text accompanying notes 111-31 supra and 144-68 infra.
140 Recently, in cases involving laws phrased in racially neutral terms, the Supreme
Court has stated that courts hearing racial discrimination challenges to laws neutral on
their face should determine whether these laws serve a hidden purpose to disadvantage
a racial minority. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 97 S. Ct.
555 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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others. 141 The statute at issue in Vlandis, in light of Justice
Stewart's characterization of residency as equivalent to domi-
cile, 42 carried a procedural purpose on its face, and the pro-
cedural interpretation of the statute in Murry was not countered
by a substantive explanation from the Agriculture Depart-
ment.143 Turner, however, does provide an example of an ef-
fort to disguise a procedure-avoidance provision.
Arguing before the Utah Supreme Court, the agency de-
fendant in Turner characterized its eighteen-week exclusion of
pregnant women from unemployment compensation as resting
on the premise that "near term pregnancy is an endemic condi-
tion relating to employability."'144 This statutory interpretation
was adopted in the opinion issued by the Utah court.145 Neither
the Utah agency nor the court considered more individualized
determinations of employability to be necessary. Before the
United States Supreme Court, however, the agency argued that
the provision was designed to limit coverage of the Utah unemp-
loyment compensation system, not to create a presumption con-
cerning employability.' 46 This switch aroused the Court's skepti-
cism, and, pointing to the procedural construction of the statute
by Utah's highest court, it refused to analyze the statute in terms
of the proffered substantive rationale.
47
It is appropriate for the courts to invalidate statutory provi-
sions challenged as conclusive presumptions when such provi-
sions are defended with questionable or seemingly contrived
substantive explanations of their objectives. Upon invalidation, a
legislature would have the option of reenacting the suspect pro-
vision, clarified by an explicit statement of substantive purpose.
This remand-type process would serve the salutory function of
enabling aggrieved parties and the courts to assess the legitimacy
of the clarified policy objective. In fact, in at least two of the
141 In Stanley, the Court considered Illinois' conclusive presumption practice to
serve administrative convenience. See 405 U.S. at 654-58. The procedural objective ex-
pressed in LaFleur was identification of teachers physically incapable of teaching. See
414 U.S. at 640-41, 643-47. For descriptions of the procedural defenses in Salf and
Turner, see text accompanying notes 124-27 supra and 144-47 infra.
142 See 412 U.S. at 442-43, 448-52.
143 See 413 U.S. at 512-14. But see id. at 524 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
144 423 U.S. at 45 n.*.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 See id. The Court did not state whether it would have looked behind a seem-
ingly contrived substantive rationale for the statute had the rationale been offered by
the legislature.
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conclusive presumption cases already decided by the Supreme
Court, the defendants did not present available substantive ar-
guments, possibly because those arguments involved statutory
objectives considered vulnerable to invalidation. 148 Also, because
a conclusive presumption invalidation of a statutory provision
does not preclude achievement of substantive policy objectives of
the legislation, it is unlikely that a legislature would reenact an
unfair procedure accompanied by a statement of a contrived
substantive purpose.
149
3. Provisions Pursuing Procedural Objectives
and Also Raising Substantive Questions
Stanley v. Illinois 15" and Cleveland Board of Education v. La-
Fleur15 1 involved measures ostensibly pursuing procedural objec-
tives. The presumption of paternal unfitness in Stanley and the
mandatory leave requirements in LaFleur, however, also could be
characterized either as the pursuit of illegitimate substantive ob-
jectives or as the pursuit of legitimate substantive objectives in a
substantively unacceptable manner. These invalidation rulings,
therefore, are vulnerable to contentions that the procedural ap-
pearance of the opinions is only a disguise for substantive
evaluations. 152 Moreover, since the conclusive presumption lan-
guage employed in these cases mirrors the doctrinal statements
made in cases like Murry, where only procedural questions were
argued, 153 these cases give rise to a temptation to question the
integrity of the conclusive presumption doctrine as a whole.'
54
In Stanley, Justice White, speaking for the majority, was able
to analyze the case on procedural terms without difficulty be-
cause the state defended the challenged provision as solely a
148 See text accompanying notes 155-56, 161 infra.
149 Cases involving conclusive presumption invalidation are unlike other cases that
might generate political pressure for reenactment of a provision invalidated for reasons
of illegitimate purpose, such as those involving charges of discriminatory intent. The
latter cases also would invite more respectable alternative purpose statements. For ex-
ample, a municipality that takes the possibly popular action of closing all of its swim-
ming pools-apparently to frustrate a desegregation order-can advance the nonracial
explanation that fiscal considerations motivated the action. See Palmer v. Thompson,
403 U.S. 217 (1971). Thus, conclusive presumption invalidations by the judiciary gener-
ally should not suffer from legislative evasion because legislators are unlikely to articu-
late false policy goals that might have little appeal to their constituents.
150 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
151 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
152 See text accompanying notes 155-66 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 118-22 supra.
154 See generally text accompanying notes 53-66 supra.
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procedural device.155 A possible substantive objective for the law,
punishment of unwed fathers and deterrence of fathering il-
legitimate children, was not raised. Stanley indicated that when
confronted with legislation vulnerable to a procedural challenge,
he Court would not probe for alternative substantive explana-
tions not explicitly introduced in the statute's defense.1 56 Of
course, the legislature retains the option to enact legislation con-
taining language highlighting the substantive objective that was
ignored in the judicial review of the conclusive presumption. If a
procedure-avoidance objective still could be discerned, a court
reviewing the new legislation then would have a clear obligation
to fashion a procedural ruling that would accommodate the
substantive objective-assuming the court finds that objective
legitimate.
157
LaFleur is more difficult to defend as a procedural ruling.
Two public policy aims of the mandatory maternity leave provi-
sion were offered in its defense-assuring instructional
continuity158 and keeping physically unfit teachers out of the
classroom, for both educational and safety reasons. 59 The latter
objective presented the procedural issue:1 611 What procedural
mechanism may the state permissibly use to identify those
teachers who are, because of pregnancy, physically unfit to
teach? A third substantive objective-keeping visibly pregnant
teachers out of the classroom-was not raised, apparently be-
cause the school board doubted its legitimacy.'
6'
Regarding the first defense, Justice Stewart, speaking for
the majority, concluded that the rules prescribing mandatory
leave at the end of the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy bore
"no rational relationship to the valid state interest of preserving
155 See 405 U.S. at 647-50.
156 Subsequently, when the Court reversed itself on the issue of conclusive pre-
sumptions in Salfi, it rejected a challenge to a statutory provision characterized primar-
ily as serving a procedural objective. The search for substantive characterizations for
the statute was minimal in Salfi because, discarding a conclusive presumption doctrine
derived exclusively from procedural due process principles, the Court decided the case
on minimum rationality grounds. See 422 U.S. at 772.
15'7 For an example of this type of review and accommodation, see text accompany-
ing notes 169-87 infra.
15s 414 U.S. at 640.
159 Id. at 641.
6
o See id. at 643-47.
161 Id. at 641 n.9. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell asserted that, in fact,
the objective of keeping "visibly pregnant teachers out of the sight of school children"
was "a principal purpose behind the adoption of the regulations." Id. at 653 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
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continuity of instruction."'162 As an example of the rules' irra-
tionality, he pointed out that such rules might compel some per-
fectly fit teachers to leave school before completing the school
year, thereby impeding instructional continuity. 163 The argu-
ment can be made, however, that long lead times and easily
identifiable departure dates are necessary to assure minimal
teacher turnover because they enable a school system to hire
substitute teachers able to serve for a lengthy period. Moreover,
just as the practice of last minute departures allows some preg-
nant teachers to complete an academic year, it also permits
others to start an academic year even if they can continue for
only a few weeks. Consequently, in terms of minimal rational-
ity, 16 4 one can question the ease with which Justice Stewart dis-
regarded the rules as a means of protecting continuity of in-
struction. Justice Stewart, therefore, really seems to have been
saying that the mandatory leave rules were unreasonable relative
to their negative effect on the important and protected "freedom
of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life."'
65
Once the maternity leave provision was rejected as an il-
legitimate means of achieving instructional continuity, only the
objective of assuring teacher fitness remained before the Court.
The teacher fitness question, on its own, presented the pro-
cedural issue of fair determination of fact that Justice Stewart
could-and apparently did-evaluate in terms of procedural due
process principles. 66 The Court's approach to the continuity
goal-requiring a greater-than-minimal justification for the pro-
vision because of the strong liberty interest involved' 67-raises
questions, however, about whether a substantive judgment pre-
determined the outcome of the procedural analysis. It is at least
12 Id. at 643.
163 Id.
164 For a discussion of the minimum rationality test, see Note, Legislative Purpose,
Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE LJ. 123 (1972). Indeed, this Note argues that
under a multiple legislative purpose analysis any statute survives a minimum rationality
review. Although LaFleur does not require a compelling interest justification for the
maternity rules, it does appear to place a higher burden of justification on the school
board rules, at least insofar as they were designed to assure continuity of instruction,
because they burdened "one of the basic civil rights of man," 414 U.S. at 640, enjoying
some degree of special constitutional protection. See text accompanying notes 71-82
supra. The subsequent Turner analysis adds to the suspicion that a substantive, special
interest analysis influenced the procedural review in LaFleur. See text accompanying
notes 67-70, 83-84supra.
16S 414 U.S. at 639.
166 Id. at 643-50.
167 See id. at 639-40.
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possible that the LaFleur majority may have placed a heavier bur-
den of justification on the procedural mechanism, regardless
of any other concerns it nurtured about the fairness of the
procedure. 168 Once judicial review is reduced to an assessment
of a procedural provision, however, the conclusive presumption
test for procedural fairness is appropriate regardless of whether
a new reasonableness review could also be applied.
4. Provisions Pursuing both Legitimate Substantive
Goals and Procedural Short Cuts
Some laws can be construed as serving a legitimate substan-
tive goal as well as a procedural purpose. In reviewing such laws,
the courts are not likely to apply the conclusive presumption
doctrine in a manner that will preclude the attainment of legiti-
mate substantive objectives. For example, although minimum
age limitations for access to driving licenses and alcoholic bev-
erages might be assailed as impermissible surrogates for indi-
vidualized determinations of competence and maturity, 169 the
spectacle of precocious sixth graders drinking beer and cruising
around town contravenes prevailing theories of proper child
rearing, elementary education, and ascent to adulthood. Regard-
less of how well some sixth graders could hold their beer or
control their cars, a legislature can justify the age minimums as
measures designed to prevent such forms of behavior from en-
gendering socially undesired attitudes on the part of the pre-
cocious children and from exerting an unwanted influence on
their more ordinary comrades.
When a statutory provision expressly announces a pro-
cedural objective, however, even if it also serves a legitimate
substantive goal, a court may feel impelled to conduct a conclu-
sive presumption review to assure procedural fairness. Thus, in
Vlandis v. Kline,'171 the Court found an explicit effort to avoid
procedural determinations by conclusively presuming certain
facts. '7 A Connecticut law classified an applicant to a Connec-
ticut public college as an "out-of-state" student throughout the
student's entire stay at the college if the student was unmarried
161 See id. at 647-48. Indeed, in Turner the Court clearly combined a substantive
concern for the special interest in childbearing with procedural fairness principles to
invalidate a conclusive presumption. See text accompanying notes 67-70, 83-84 supra.
'69 See, e.g., id. at 658-59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
170 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
171 Id. at 451.
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and his "legal address for any part of the one-year period im-
mediately prior to his application for admission ... was outside
of Connecticut";1 72 a married student who lived with his spouse
and had a "legal address at the time of his application.., outside
of Connecticut"1 73 was similarly classified. According to Justice
Stewart, who wrote the majority opinion, these residency provi-
sions served as substitutes for individual determinations of a
generally recognized residency status, essentially akin to domi-
cile.174 Consequently, the Court ordered a more individual-
ized residency determination.
75
The Supreme Court recognized, however, that the pro-
visions challenged in Vlandis also served a legitimate state
policy-the subsidization of Connecticut residents attending
Connecticut's state colleges'176-which would be jeopardized by
the requirement of individualized determinations of residency.
In this sense, because many out-of-state applicants could "ar-
range" to satisfy the usual indicia of domicile, the Connecticut
legislature was not attempting to avoid the procedural burden of
adjudicatory factfinding, but rather the very result of factfind-
ing. If Connecticut were forced to charge lower tuition and fees
to many out-of-state students, it might decide to reduce the
subsidy provided to all students qualifying as Connecticut
residents. 77 To the extent permitted by law, it also might impose
stringent restrictions on the admission of out-of-state students.
Possibly, the state would cut back on some of its college pro-
grams to compensate for money lost because of a decline in
tuition revenue from out-of-state students. 78 These possibilities
demonstrate the potentially highly disruptive effect of the
Court's order that Connecticut ascertain residency on an indi-
vidual basis.
landis represents a concession to the substantive policy in-
1
7
1 Id. at 442 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 10-329(b) (Supp. 1969), as amended
by Pub. Act. No. 5, § 122 (June 1971)).
71d. at 443 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 10-329(b) (Supp. 1969), as amended
by Pub. Act. No. 5, § 126(a)(3) (June 1971)).
174 Id. at 448, 453-54.
175 See id. at 453-54.
176 See id. at 452-53.
177 See Weisbrod, Geographic Spillover Effects and the Allocation of Resources to Educa-
tion, in THE PUBLIC ECONOMY OF URBAN COMMUNITIES 192 (J. Margolis ed. 1965).
Weisbrod concludes that benefit spillovers, viewed in terms of the migration of
graduates out of a local public school system, lead to a reduction in local education
expenditures. Id. at 204-05.
11 See 412 U.S. at 464-65 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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terest threatened by the anti-conclusive presumption holding.
The majority, although striking down the Connecticut residency
definitions, cited with approval an earlier summary affirmance
of a lower court decision approving Minnesota's requirement
that a student reside in the state for one year in order to qualify
for a reduced tuition rate. 179 Since the Minnesota regulation
allows a student to offer proof of domicile after living in the
state for one year-the one year's residence serves as one indi-
cator of domicile-an out-of-state student can take advantage of
the lower tuition and fees starting with his or her second year of
state college enrollment.' Nevertheless, Minnesota does estab-
lish the conclusive presumption that no state college applicant
who has resided in Minnesota for less than one year is a state
resident at the time of matriculation or at any time during the
first school year.' 8' The only difference between the Minnesota
presumption that was upheld and the Connecticut presumption
that was stricken is the permanence of Connecticut's conclusive
presumption. The Court's acceptance of the Minnesota scheme
allows the state to have a workable policy of subsidizing in-state
public college students. A state college system like Minnesota's is
assured of at least one year's higher tuition and fees from out-
of-state students; even this limited preservation of the differen-
tial tuition and fee system provides financial support for main-
taining lower cost education for longtime state residents.
Similarly, in LaFleur, Justice Stewart may have been suggest-
ing an analogous accommodation of procedural fairness and pol-
icy objectives-in that case the objective of assuring continuity of
instruction. Although he rejected the lengthy enforced maternity
leave implemented by the school boards, Justice Stewart did sug-
gest that insofar as "[tihe Fourteenth Amendment requires the
school boards to employ alternative administrative means, which
do not so broadly infringe upon basic constitutional liberty, in
support of their legitimate goals,' 882 rules "requiring a termina-
tion of employment at some firm date during the last few weeks
of pregnancy"' 83 might be acceptable. Such later dates, repre-
senting a reasonable accommodation of competing interests,
179 412 U.S. at 452-53 n.9, (citing Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn.
1970), aff'd mer., 401 U.S. 985 (1971)).
180 412 U.S. at 452-53 n.9.
181 See id. at 467 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
182 414 U.S. at 647.
183 Id. at 647 n.13.
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would constitute a conclusive presumption similar to the one-
year residency requirement accepted in Vlandis.'84
The Vlandis accommodation of procedural protection and
achievement of substantive policy goals reflects the balancing
formula developed in Goldberg v. Kelly18 5 and subsequent pro-
cedural due process cases. 186 Because the conclusive presump-
tion doctrine is designed to guarantee appropriate procedural
safeguards, the doctrine is not any more protective of procedure
at the expense of program objectives than is the parent doctrine
of procedural due process. Just as cases like Arnett v. Kennedy1
8 7
limited procedural protections to permit fair realization of legis-
latively prescribed policy objectives, Vlandis also stopped short of
an absolute bar to a conclusive presumption in order to protect a
legitimate program goal.
B. The Reasonableness of Individualized Determinations
as an Alternative to a Presumption
Application of conclusive presumption analysis, limited by
the requirement that the provision under review can be charac-
terized as having a procedural purpose, 88 is also constrained by
the feasibility of individualized factfinding as an alternative to a
conclusive presumption. The Supreme Cotirt often has asserted
that due process interests supersede claims of mere administra-
tive convenience.' 89 Convenience, however, is not the same as
feasibility; thus, for example, in Vlandis and LaFleur the Court
expressly observed that "reasonable alternative means" for
achieving a procedural objective were available. 9 "
184 This analysis puts LaFleur in the same category as Vlandis; that is, cases involving
both a clear and legitimate substantive objective as well as a procedure-avoidance de-
vice. In the preceding section, text accompanying notes 150-68, supra, LaFleur could be
analyzed as a case reducible to a procedural question alone because the Court invali-
dated, by employing a sliding scale equal protection analysis, the rules implemented
by the school boards as a means for achieving instructional continuity. The inquiry then
focused on the rules as a mechanism for determining the physical capabilities of preg-
nant teachers. See text accompanying notes 158-68, supra. Once the Court's focus re-
turns to a legitimate substantive objective in LaFleur-the promotion of instructional
continuity-the fashioning of a remedy for procedural unfairness should attempt to
accommodate, to some degree, achievement of that legitimate objective.
185 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
188 See text accompanying notes 13-33 supra.
187 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
188 See text accompanying notes 111-87 supra.
189 See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-58 (1972).
19 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647 n.14 (1974); Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 454 (1973).
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1. The Presence of Recognizable Standards
A primary factor affecting procedural feasibility is the sub-
stantive nature of the statute in question. As Justice Brennan
observed in his Salfi dissent, the Court has struck down conclu-
sive presumptions only where it was "possible to specify those fac-
tors which, if proven in a hearing, would disprove a rebuttable
presumption."f 9 In all cases in which the Supreme Court has
invalidated conclusive presumptions, the statute or regulation in
question contained an express or implicit standard, recognized
and understood by the affected parties, that could be applied on
an individualized basis to determine the existence or nonexis-
tence of the same facts that the provision instead presumed. In
Murry, for example, the predominant redistributive goal of the
Food Stamp Act was to aid households defined as needy in terms
of per capita income; the Court rejected section 5(b) of the Act
because it conclusively presumed that certain households did not
satisfy that objective income standard. 192 Similarly, no one really
contended that the physical fitness of pregnant teachers in La-
Fleur or the capacity of a pregnant clerk to continue working in
Turner could not be determined on an individual basis by apply-
ing commonly accepted medical standards. 93 The parental un-
fitness presumed in Stanley could be determined on an individual
basis by applying commonly accepted legal standards of "reason-
able fitness."'194 Bell required only a simple preliminary determi-
nation of liability in an automobile accident, 195 and even the
residency question in Vlandis was answerable in terms of existing
criteria for a determination of domicile.' 96 Moreover, as Justice
Brennan explained, evidence of a wage earner's good health at
the time of marriage could disprove the insurance collusion
feared in Salf.1
97
If a challenged statute or regulation does not contain some
indication of the facts that could be determined in an indi-
191 422 U.S. at 804 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192 See text accompanying notes 118-22 supra.
1'9See 414 U.S. at 645 n.12, 647 n.14.
194 When an unwed father is not involved, Illinois provides for determination of
parental fitness in a neglect proceeding. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 37, § 704-8 (Smith-Hurd
1972), Juvenile Court Act § 4-8 (providing that the "best interests of the minor and the
public" are to be considered in deciding whether a child is to be made a ward of the
court due to delinquency or neglect).
19 402 U.S. at 539-43.
196 412 U.S. at 454.
197 422 U.S. at 804 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:761
vidualized proceeding, then a conclusive presumption invalida-
tion would require a legislature not only to create an indiv-
dualized procedure, but also to make substantive judgments
concerning the goals of the procedural determination. Con-
clusive presumption invalidations necessitating such legislative
judgments would intrude the courts much more deeply into the
legislative process than is the case under present due process and
equal protection law. Statutory reliance on income limits for ap-
portioning social welfare subsidies, for example, can be viewed
as a procedural short cut for making individualized determina-
tions of "need" and so might appear vulnerable to a conclusive
presumption invalidation: individuals are precluded from de-
monstrating "need" if their incomes are above the prescribed
level. A relatively objective alternative, however, is not discern-
ible from the program goal of a social welfare statute. Although
households above a specified income limit may be needier than
or equal in need to households below the limit, demarcation of
poverty levels to determine true "need" involves difficult line
drawing questions not present in the conclusive presumption
cases already decided. Although need standards could be de-
veloped that take into account relevant factors in addition to
per capita income, formulating these standards necessarily
would embroil the judiciary in policy considerations. Must a
need test allow households to deduct all medical expenditures?
Should medical deductions be permitted only after discount-
ing the cost of medical services to the lowest cost services avail-
able in each household's community? Can ordinary illnesses
be excluded from the deduction category because such ill-
nesses average out over time for households above and below
the subsidy eligibility line as presently drawn? Similar questions
can also be raised concerning the manner in which a multitude
of other factors should affect eligibility for social welfare prog-
rams.
The conclusive presumption decisions have accepted legisla-
tive standards as given.1 98 They do not require law makers to
establish categories precisely tailored to fit the overall goals of a
statute. A requirement of categorical exactness would require
legislatures to expend much of their energy making adjudi-
catory-type decisions. Generally, constitutional principles require
19See text accompanying notes 191-97 supra and note 200 infra & accompanying
text.
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only that legislative standards create resonably inclusive cate-
gories, thereby allowing lawmakers the latitude necessary for
framing laws of general application; 99 a law designed to fight a
certain problem need not attack all causes of the problem.2 1111 To
guarantee that legislatures do not choose unfair procedures for
applying the standards that implement the statute's policy goals,
however, the courts properly have invoked the conclusive pre-
sumption doctrine.
2. A Balancing Analysis of the Administrative Burden
The Court's concern for the availability of a reasonable al-
ternative procedure to a conclusive presumption in LaFleur and
Vlandis 201 indicates that the Court is reluctant to require extra-
ordinarily costly individualized determinations. The Court's ac-
ceptance of what amounts to a one-year conclusive presumption
in the state college residency cases, for example, may, in part,
signal a sensitivity to the weight of the administrative burden
that results from an individualized determination of residency.
Indeed, in Vlandis Justice Stewart expressed an awareness "of the
special problems involved in determining the bona fide resi-
dence of college students who come from out of State to attend
that State's public university. '' 212 He then asserted that a reason-
able durational residency requirement can legitimately serve "as




The Supreme Court also has indicated that an individ-
ualized determination is unnecessary when no one is signifi-
cantly harmed by the use of a conclusive presumption and when
the use of an individualized process would substantially under-
mine the effectiveness of a regulatory law. Regulation Z,20)4
promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board in implementation of
the 1968 Truth in Lending Act,20 5 directs businesses that extend
credit payable in more than four installments to make disclo-
199 See, e.g., sources cited in note 3 supra.
200, Firmly established equal protection doctrine recognizes that "reform may take
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most
acute to the legislative mind." Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
201 See text accompanying notes 170-87 supra.
2112 412 U.S. at 452. For a discussion of the weight to be given financial considera-
tions in determining whether due process requires a particular procedural safeguard,
see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-48 (1976).
2113 412 U.S. at 452.
2114 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.12 (1976).
205 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (1970 & West Supp. 2, 1976).
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sures mandated by the Act. 2°6 The Act itself only required mer-
chants to make these disclosures if they "extend credit, with at-
tendant finance charges. ''2 17 In Mourning v. Family Publications
Service, Inc.2118 a magazine subscription company claimed that
since the statutory disclosure requirements only apply when a
merchant has attached a finance charge to extended credit, Reg-
ulation Z conclusively presumes that all extensions of credit
repayable in more than four installments include finance
charges.2 9 Although the Mourning majority professed not to see
the alleged presumption,2 10 the Court's approval of Regulation
Z could be justified under the theory that the disclosure re-
quirement's broad classificatory trigger is necessary for the
effective operation of the statute.211 Moreover, the Court in
Mourning could have considered the harm to the affected parties
to be relatively insignificant.
Judicial acceptance of presumptive determinations in the
Mourning context reflects the balancing approach of Goldberg v.
Kelly212 and subsequent cases. The procedural due process cases
exhibit a judicial refusal to impose severe administrative costs
when individual harm is slight and administrative burdens would
seriously weaken the efficacy of a government program. 21 3 Simi-
lar balancing judgments appropriately can be applied in all con-
clusive presumption cases.
3. Permissible Procedural Presumptions
Even when individualized determinations are constitution-
206 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(s) (1976).
2117 Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 361 (1973) (sum-
marizing § 103(f) of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1970)).
28 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
29 See id. at 376-77 (rejecting the conclusive presumption claim on the ground that
the disclosure requirement is a "prophylactic measure" rather than a conclusive pre-
sumption); cf. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 546-47
(1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing the rule at issue in Mourning as discouraging
evasion of the disclosure mechanism); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413
U.S. 508, 522-27 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that conclusive presump-
tions are appropriate as prophylactic limitations on dispensing funds, when designed to
avoid abuse through evasion or fraud).
211 See 411 U.S. at 377.
211 See id. The balancing of individual interests against effective administration of a
regulatory statute as a basis for upholding a conclusive presumption may quiet one
critic's concern about the possible use of the conclusive presumption doctrine to invali-
date regulatory statutes, in particular § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78(p)(b) (1970), dealing with insider trading. See Note, The Conclusive Presump-
tion Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72 MICH. L. REv. 800, 833-34 (1974).
212 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
213 See text accompanying notes 26-33 supra.
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ally required, a governmental entity still may manage its ad-
ministrative tasks by resorting to certain permissible presump-
tions. A rebuttable presumption, for example, may be legitimate
if it is reasonable.214
In cases of rebuttable presumptions involving a broad or
otherwise questionable exercise of administrative discretion, a
court should require an agency to establish a factual record that
supports the contention that the presumption reasonably pro-
motes the agency's statutory mission.215 In addition, any agency
must administer fairly a rebuttable presumption. If an agency
disregards the favorable implications of virtually all evidence
proferred by a person seeking to avoid a negative presumption,
then the agency in effect is administering a conclusive presump-
tion. To avoid this kind of abuse, an agency should specify the
kind of favorable evidence that would rebut a presumption.
21 6
Finally, Under general principles of due process the courts still
could review the legitimacy of a reversal burden in terms of the
objectives of the statute in question.
As the Supreme Court demonstrated in Mathews v. Lucas ,217
"inclusive" conclusive presumptions may also be legal. This type
of presumption may be characterized as a legislative attempt to
allocate a benefit by resorting to a less costly system that allows
all those entitled to the benefit to receive it, while avoiding the
time and expense of making individual determinations for
everyone. For example, the statute involved in Lucas gave surviv-
ing child's benefits to the dependent children of deceased wage
earners. The conclusive presumption upheld by the court ex-
214 See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452-53 n.9 (1973).
215 See generally Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971); Shannon v. Department of Housing and Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir.
1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied sub nom. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf., 384 U.S.
941 (1966); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 488 F.2d
559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. California Highway Comm'n v. La Raza Unida,
409 U.S. 890 (1972); Western Addition Community Org. v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433
(N.D. Cal. 1968), vacated sub nom. Western Addition Community Org. v. Romney, 320
F. Supp. 308 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Powelton Civic Homeowners Ass'n v. Department of
Housing and Urban Dev., 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
216 For a discussion of such a proposal for regulatory agencies using the statistical
technique of multiple regression analysis, see Finkelstein, Regression Models in Administra-
tive Proceedings, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1442, 1455-62 (1973). Finkelstein suggests that "a
decision-maker should (i) specify the data of such relevance and importance that he
finds merits econometric analysis, and (ii) require that data and incorporate other data
on a separate basis only when necessary for purposes of accuracy or refinement." Id. at
1461.
217 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
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cluded no dependent children from the benefits, but did con-
clusively include other children, whether or not they were in fact
dependent on the wage earner.218 The Court applied a reason-
ableness test to assess the validity of the presumption.
Whenever members of a specified group are conclusively
presumed to meet the criteria governing the allocation of a ben-
efit, however, a discrimination is worked against persons outside
that group; "undeserving" members in the group receive the
benefit while "undeserving" members outside the group are de-
nied it. In Lucas, nondependent legitimate children received be-
nefits while nondependent illegitimate children did not. This
type of discrimination could make the allocation mechanism vul-
nerable to an equal protection attack, which, in turn, could re-
quire the state to demonstrate that its inclusive presumption is
clearly and significantly less costly than individualized determi-
nations. Although such an equal protection argument was re-
jected in Lucas, a similar analysis was applied in Frontiero v.






219 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
221 Under the federal law at issue in Frontiero, a member of the uniformed military
services with dependents qualifies for an increased "basic allowance for quarters," 37
U.S.C. § 403 (1970), and comprehensive medical and dental care for the dependents,
10 U.S.C. § 1076 (1970). Although the wife of a male member of the uniformed ser-
vices was presumed to be dependent on her husband, whether she was in fact depen-
dent or not, a female member was required to prove her husband's dependence. See 37
U.S.C. § 401 (1970). To satisfy the statutory criterion for dependency, the woman must
provide more than one-half of her husband's support. 10 U.S.C. § 1072(2) (1970).
Paralleling the situation in Lucas, nondependent wives received benefits while non-
dependent husbands did not. The different treatment of dependents according to the
sex of the service member nonetheless was invalidated; the classification based on sex
triggered a standard of review more rigorous than the reasonableness standard em-
ployed in Lucas. Speaking for the Lucas Court, Justice Blackmun asserted that the Fron-
tiero classification received the "strictest scrutiny," 427 U.S. at 509, and could only be
justified by "a showing that the Government's dollar 'lost' to overincluded benefit re-
cipients is returned by a dollar 'saved' in administrative expense avoided," 427 U.S. at
509-10. Although the Frontiero plurality ruled that sex classifications are suspect and
therefore subject to the closest judicial scrutiny, see 411 U.S. at 682, a majority of the
Court has never adopted such a position, see Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
Nevertheless, the Court has determined that sex classifications warrant a high standard
of equal protection review. See text accompanying notes 83-84 supra.
A similar willingness to apply a higher standard of equal protection review on be-
half of illegitimate children would be necessary in order to invalidate the Lucas provi-
sion. The Lucas majority argued that the statute involved "does not broadly discriminate
between legitimates and illegitimates without more, but is carefully tuned to alternative
considerations." 427 U.S. at 513. Justice Stevens' dissent, however, raised substantial
questions concerning whether the inclusive presumption rejected in Frontiero was sig-
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IV. EXAMPLES OF LAWS THAT SURVIVE CONCLUSIVE
PRESUMPTION REVIEW
A brief survey of some of the laws that might be challenged
as conclusive presumptions will illustrate the principles that con-
fine a conclusive presumption doctrine defined in terms of pro-
cedural due process. One set of such laws, the minimum age
laws, has already been shown to escape proscription because
such laws pursue legitimate substantive objectives.22' Courts also
would be sensitive to claims that more individualized alternatives
to age minimums would impose exceptional administrative
burdens.
222
A. Mandatory Retirement Laws
At first glance, laws requiring retirement at a specified age
appear vulnerable to a conclusive presumption challenge. To the
extent that such mandatory retirement laws rest on judgments of
job competence, they often could be replaced by appropriate
work-related testing and job performance ratings.223 Further,
not only are feasible methods available for individually determin-
ing incompetence, but also the need for those determinations are
not likely to occur at an administratively arduous rate. Overall,
the kind of determination obviated by an age ceiling is precisely
the kind of decision often made in an adjudicatory proceeding
and one that appropriately is made on an individualized basis.
Nonprocedural policies, however, may underlie and justify
age ceilings. In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,
224
which upheld Massachusetts' requirement that uniformed state
police officers retire at age 50,225 the state offered nonpro-
cedural explanations in addition to defending its classification
on a reasonableness basis. Massachusetts, citing the desirability
nificantly less accurate than the inclusive presumption upheld in Lucas. 427 U.S. at
521-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
221 See text accompanying note 169 supra.
222 See text accompanying note 213 supra.
223 See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1970 & Supp. V 1975); Stessin, The Axe and Older Workers, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1974,
§ 3, at 3, col. 1. The argument can be made that the age limit helps to avoid confronta-
tions with older employees who would suffer from individual determinations of incom-
petence. Some older workers, however, probably suffer more by being forced to aban-
don gainful employment at a time when continued productive performance is possible.
See Stessin, supra.
224 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
225 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 32, § 26(3)(a) (1973).
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of a rapid promotion schedule, argued before the district court
that early retirement boosted the morale of younger state police
officers. 226 Moreover, as a public policy matter-a matter pecul-
iarly within the competence of a legislature to determine-it may
be desirable to minimize unemployment among younger work-
ers in order to lessen the occurrence of youthful demoralization
and alienation. The age distribution of public employees also has
an impact on government expenditures. 2 7 New York City offi-
cials, for example, recently attempted to jettison older workers as
a means for alleviating the city's budget crisis.228 In Murgia itself,
however, one should note that neither the three-judge federal
district court nor the Supreme Court applied or even mentioned
conclusive presumption analysis; both evaluated the case under
standards of equal protection review. Reversing the district
court, which rejected the age limit as failing to satisfy a rational
basis test,229 the Supreme Court held that the retirement law
does rest on a rational basis, 3 and concluded that the age dis-
crimination and employment opportunity questions presented
failed to qualify for a more demanding standard of equal protec-
tion review. 23l
Both Justice Marshall's dissent and the district court's opin-
ion in Murgia raise a procedural factor tlat could save an age
ceiling from a conclusive presumption invalidation. They point
out that in some situations the measurement and prediction of
individual fitness and ability may be extremely difficult or even
impossible.232 Although measurement problems should not be
an excuse for routinely accepting conclusive presumptions, such
problems are relevant. In particular, measurement problems de-
serve close attention when they involve laws designed to protect
public safety and health.
For example, although the Murgia district court and Justice
Marshall both rejected the Massachusetts age ceiling, they ap-
226 Murgia v. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. 753, 754 (D. Mass.
1974), rev'd, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
221 Older workers usually have accrued seniority, and so may receive higher wages
than younger workers performing the same jobs. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 5332 (Supp. V
1975).22 ' See N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1974, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1974, at 1, col.
2; N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1974, at 1, col. 5.
229 376 F. Supp. at 754, 756.
220 427 U.S. at 314-17.
231Id. at 312-14.
232 Id. at 326 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 376 F. Supp. at 755.
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provingly cited Air Line Pilots Association, International v. Que-
sada, 2 33 which upheld a regulation prescribing retirement for
commercial airline pilots at age sixty. The Quesada ruling was
considered proper because it rested on a conclusion that the
results of physical examinations of pilots age sixty and older lack
the desired degree of predictive accuracy.234 When the risks as-
sociated with inaccurate measurement are high and special
measurement problems are presented, as in Quesada, the judicial
approval of age ceilings is proper.
The Murgia Court listed important public safety functions
performed by the state police,235 but made no serious effort to
demonstrate that fitness was not adequately measurable after the
age of forty-nine. It did mention that an evaluation of a potential
cardiovascular failure "would require a detailed number of
studies ,' 236 but did not argue that such testing would be un-
reasonably burdensome or that administrative burdens would
interfere with the effectiveness of state police programs. Al-
though serious measurement problems involving achievement of
public safety goals possibly could have been cited as a procedural
justification for the Massachusetts age ceiling, the Murgia de-
cision neither offers nor supports such a defense to a conclusive
presumption challenge. The Murgia result, however, can be exp-
lained in terms of the nonprocedural objectives asserted by
Massachusetts.
237
B. Protective Regulatory Laws
Chief Justice Burger has argued that the conclusive pre-
sumption doctrine is unjustifiably contrary to the present design
of many regulatory statutes and introduces doctrinal difficulties
for thousands of state laws.2 3 8 As an example, he points to the
common case where
A State provides that a person may not be licensed to
practice medicine or law unless he or she is a graduate
of an accredited professional graduate school; a per-
fectly capable practitioner may as a consequence be
233 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960).
234 Id. at 898.
235 427 U.S. at 310.
23 6 Id.
237 See text accompanying notes 224-28 supra.
23' See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 442 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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barred "permanently and irrebuttably" from pursuing
his calling, without ever having an opportunity to prove
his personal skill.
23 9
A conclusive presumption doctrine defined in terms of ap-
propriate procedural principles should allay the Chief Justice's
fears. In the medical licensing situation presented above, denial
of individualized competency determinations to persons who
have not attended medical school, but who nonetheless claim
adequate medical competence, properly serves the legislative pol-
icy of licensing doctors in accordance with highly protective
standards. The state might reasonably determine that gradua-
tion from a medical school assures at least a minimum level of
medical skill, knowledge, experience, maturity, and good judg-
ment and that there is no alternative objective test that ade-
quately measures these qualities. Under such circumstances, and
in order to protect the health and safety of the state's citizens,
the state reasonably could require all doctors practicing within its
borders to graduate from medical school. Given these public
health and safety objectives of a medical licensing system, the
state should not be required to implement testing procedures of
questionable accuracy in measuring the relevant criteria.24"
This approach was evident in Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott
and Dunning, Inc.,241 in which the Court upheld a drug licensing
program administered by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) under the 1962 amendments to the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act of 1938.242 That law directs the FDA to deny
the approval required to bring a new drug onto the market
unless "substantial evidence" of the drug's effectiveness was
supplied.2 43 The Commissioner of the FDA issued a series of
regulations setting threshold standards for "adequate and well-
controlled investigations," which, under the statute, comprised
"substantial evidence. ' 244 Investigations not satisfying these
standards were disallowed as evidence of drug effectiveness; if
an applicant presented no evidence that "on its face" met the
239 Id.
24 See text accompanying notes 232-34 supra. Moreover, a state's judgment about
the reliability of such testing is especially deserving of deference since medical gradua-
tion requirements do not permanently bar access to the practice of medicine.
241 412 U.S. 609 (1973).
242 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1970).
243 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) & (e) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
244 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1970).
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prescribed standards, the application was rejected without an
opportunity to present alternative evidence.24 5
The same type of considerations that favored judicial defer-
ence in the medical licensing situation were present in Hynson.
The FDA, in pursuit of its statutory directives, administers broad
public health and safety measures. 246 Its reasonable judgments
concerning the reliability of different types of evidence should
be upheld by the courts. Even though the FDA regulations at
issue in Hynson can be viewed as denying applicants a more indi-
vidualized factual review, they differ significantly from the gov-
ernment practices examined in the conclusive presumption
cases. By using its evidentiary threshold rules, the FDA is not
confining its inquiry to certain factual presentations as a mere
shortcut to avoid reviewing a broader array of relevant factors;
rather, as the Court recognized, the conclusive "standard of 'well
controlled investigations' particularized by the regulations is a
protective measure designed to ferret out those drugs for which
there is no affirmative, reliable evidence of effectiveness.
247
In other cases involving regulatory threshold judgments,
factfinding in the Goldberg sense is not in question. In United
States v. Storer Broadcasting,2 4 the Supreme Court allowed the
FCC by rule to preclude additional licensing for an applicant
who exceeded the FCC's limitation on multiple radio and TV
station ownership. Likewise, in Federal Power Commission v.
Texaco, 24 9 the Court upheld an FPC rule automatically rejecting
an independent natural gas producer's application for permis-
sion to supply natural gas to a pipeline if the submitted contract
contained proscribed pricing provisions. Both the FCC and FPC
administer broad public interest statutory standards.2 5" Unlike
the factfinding process in the conclusive presumption and fair
adjudication cases, these agency determinations do not involve
the application of objective standards. Instead, the threshold re-
quirements in Storer and Texaco represent administrative transla-
245 412 U.S. at 620.
246 Id. at 622.
247 Id.
248 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
249 377 U.S. 33 (1964).
25 The Federal Power Commission makes determinations concerning the transpor-
tation and sale of natural gas by applying a "public convenience and necessity" stan-
dard. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1970). In awarding broadcast licenses, the Federal Communi-
cations Commission determines how the "public convenience, interest, or necessity" will
be served. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1970).
19771
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:761
tions of general statutory commands into more specific policy
priorities. In Texaco, Justice Douglas expressly recognized this
policy-making function as he described the FPC establishment
of thresholds as "particularizing statutory standards through the
rule-making process.
25 1
C. Fund Allocation Decisions
Jefferson v. Hackney 252 exemplifies a type of funding alloca-
tion that escapes the individualized determination requirement.
InJefferson, Texas recipients of Aid to Families With Dependent
Children (AFDC)253 challenged the legality of the less favorable
welfare treatment they received relative to the aid given recip-
ients of Old Age Assistance (OAA),254 Aid for the Permanently
and Totally Disabled (APTD),255 and Aid to the Blind (AB).
256
The Texas welfare scheme subsidized AFDC families to an
amount equal to seventy-five percent of their statutorily defined
needs while subsidizing OAA, APTD, and AB recipients to
amounts equaling ninety-five percent of need or higher. 57 The
Supreme Court upheld the lower subsidy for AFDC families
because Texas could reasonably decide that
the aged and infirm are the least able of the categorical
grant recipients to bear the hardships of an inadequate
standard of living. While different policy judgments are
of course possible, it is not irrational for the State to
believe that the young are more adaptable than the sick
and elderly, especially because the latter have less hope
of improving their situation in the years remaining to
them.25 8
Legislative policy decisions about which groups to ben-
efit-and to what extent-generally are reviewed under the
permissive equal protection standard of reasonableness. If, for
251 377 U.S. at 39.
252 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
253 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-644 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-644 (Supp. V
1975).
254 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-306 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-306 (Supp. V
1975).
255 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1355 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1355 (Supp. V
1975).
256 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1206 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1355 (Supp. V
1975).
257 406 U.S. at 537 n.3.
258
1 Id. at 549; see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
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example, a legislature were required to distribute equally aid to
all OAA, APTD, and AB beneficiaries and AFDC households
that could demonstrate commensurate need, the contemporary
political process would be substantially altered. Legislative action
favoring groups on moral, political, or fiscal policy grounds
would not be possible.259 In any case, the legislative concept of
relative need as a basis for allocating welfare funds may not be
amenable to the kind of adjudicatory factual determination
found necessary in the cases invalidating conclusive presump-
tions. How does one refute the legislative determination that the
indigent disabled, blind, and aged are needier than indigent
families headed by females? The Texas assistance statutes do not
provide an objective basis for making this kind of determination.
The conclusive presumption doctrine does not address
statutory provisions that embody legislative policy judgments
concerning nonprocedural objectives like the allocation of lim-
ited resources. Instead, it deals with provisions aimed at avoiding
individualized determinations of statutory coverage. 26" The
statutory distinction in Jefferson, for example, should escape con-
clusive presumption scrutiny because it is based on the kind of
policy judgment a legislature is expected to make; it is not a
legislative effort to avoid individualized procedures for deter-
mining need.
By contrast, the provision of the Food Stamp Act invalidated
in Murry did not embody the same kind of allocation decision. 26'
Congress did not decide that all households with members 18
years or older who were claimed as tax dependents by individu-
als outside the household were not in need of food stamps, re-
gardless of whether the tax dependents actually received outside
income. Instead, Congress intended to deny food stamps to
households adequately supported by outside income. Despite the
very individualized nature of this goal, the statute avoided
specific determinations of which households were ineligible by
use of a broad presumption. Such an administrative short cut
can be challenged-and in this case rejected-by a procedure-
oriented conclusive presumption analysis.
D. Land-Use Restrictions
Another type of statute that survives conclusive presump-
259 See 406 U.S. at 548-49.
26 See text accompanying notes 118-87 supra.
261 See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
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tion scrutiny is the zoning ordinance upheld in Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas.26 2 That ordinance permitted as inhabitants of
Belle Terre only households of "persons related by blood, adop-
tion, or marriage" or of no more than two persons "living and
cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not re-
lated by blood, adoption, or marriage.
263
The Belle Terre ordinance, apparently designed to ban large
"households" of college students, was defended as a reasonable
means of limiting noisy lifestyles and increased traffic con-
gestion. 264 Indeed, the theory that a zoning authority anticipates
nuisances and then precludes or controls them by regulating
land uses provides a doctrinal justification for the creation of
land-use zones and a defense against claims of improper depri-
vation of property rights.265 To be sure, Belle Terre might have
avoided these nuisances more discriminatingly by making indi-
vidualized determinations of household behavior; its ordinance
escapes conclusive presumption reversal, however, because zon-
ing practice has grown beyond its nuisance roots. There is a
general acceptance of a role for zoning that transcends indi-
vidualized nuisance-type determinations. Many view zoning reg-
ulation as a legitimate means for a local government to imple-
ment its vision of a better community.2 66 Thus, writing for the
Court in Belle Terre, Justice Douglas claimed that the ordinance
preserved the attractiveness of the community for families.
267
Regardless of whether family zones are quieter and enjoy re-
duced vehicular traffic, some families may prefer to live in a
neighborhood where all the other households are similarly struc-
262 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
26 3 Id. at 2.
264 Id. at 9.
265 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-90 (1926). See
generally Ackerman, Impact Statements and Low Cost Housing, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 754
(1973); Kleven, Inclusionary Ordinances-Policy and Legal Issues in Requiring Private Develop-
ers to Build Low Cost Housing, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1432, 1493-96 (1974); Lefcoe, The
Public Housing Referendum Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59 CAL. L. REv. 1384,
1443-44 (1971).
266 For examples of decisions thoughtfully evaluating zoning ordinances defended
in terms of community preservation and environmental goals, see Steel Hill Dev., Inc.
v. Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972); Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 353 (1971), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S.
808 (1975); National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597
(1965).
267 416 U.S. at 9. Another nonprocedural objective expressed in Belle Terre was
stabilization of the community's rent structure. See 416 U.S. at 18 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). In some cases this substantive goal alone might be reason enough to limit college
student access to community housing.
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tured. An individualized determination requirement for all
land-use regulations would seriously frustrate the attempt to
serve such abstract "family values. '2 68 Comprehensive land-use
planning, expressing policy judgments and aimed at fostering a
particular community character, would flounder on a require-
ment of individualized adjudications.
269
E. Classifications by Sex
In Kahn v. Shevin,2 711 the Supreme Court upheld a Florida
law providing a $500 per year property tax exemption for wid-
ows, but not for widowers. Generally, tax preference provisions
escape conclusive presumption scrutiny because a substantive
objective is readily discernible. A tax break for farmers, for ex-
ample, might be aimed at encouraging greater agricultural pro-
duction. In a nonincentive area such as tax aid for the blind, the
preference serves as partial compensation for a handicap. In a
sense, the Court upheld the Florida tax law as compensation for
the economic disadvantage in being female.271 Justices Brennan
and Marshall, dissenting, agreed that the tax break served a
legitimate remedial purpose.
272
In spite of substantive justifications, the statute is subject to
procedural challenge for improperly dispensing with individual
determinations of which widows are in fact economically disad-
vantaged because of their sex. The law, however, does not pro-
vide objective standards for individually determining sex-based
economic disadvantage. Just as in the case of income limits serv-
ing as standards for allocating social welfare subsidies,273 judicial
reversal for failure to use individualized determinations would
require the legislature not only to establish a procedure, but also
to make substantive judgments concerning how to fashion objec-
tive standards for identifying sex-based economic disadvantage.
26 8 
Id.
269 Satisfying a conclusive presumption test obviously would not save the Belle Terre
ordinance from proscription on other grounds. Although a wealth of material analyzing
zoning schemes that restrict the access of certain groups to suburban communities ex-
isted, the Court's opinion ignored the issues raised in the literature. For a critical ex-
amination of restrictive zoning practices, see Ackerman, The Mount Laurel Decision: Ex-
panding the Boundaries of Zoning Reforn, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1; Ellickson, Alternatives to
Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. Rv. 681
(1973); id. 703 n.83, 704 n.89 (collecting sources).
270 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
271 Id. at 353-55.
27 2 Id. at 358-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
272 See text accompanying notes 252-61 supra.
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Consequently, the provision is not subject to a conclusive pre-
sumption review. Moreover, even if the requisite standards were
provided, the Florida law could only be characterized as




Fearing that the conclusive presumption doctrine would be-
come "a virtual engine of destruction for countless legislative
judgments" 275 and unable to discern limiting principles sufficient
to hold the doctrine to manageable proportions, the Supreme
Court rejected conclusive presumption analysis in Salfi. An ex-
amination of the underlying principles of the doctrine and how
it has been applied, however, reveals that it properly can be
confined to cases involving unfair adjudicatory practices. Thus,
when a statute or rule is construed or defended as primarily
serving a procedural purpose, and when either the statute or
rule itself or judicial or administrative tradition presents discrete,
objective criteria recognized and understood by the affected par-
ties, then conclusive presumption review provides a means for
assuring some minimal level of procedural fairness. Defined in
these terms, this procedural doctrine limits fair adjudication re-
quirements to those situations in which one usually expects to
find individualized factfinding.
At the hazy margin of due process, the procedural analysis
prevents legislatures and agencies from abusing their broad
powers of classification; it forbids classifications defined by pre-
sumed facts that can and should be determined on an indi-
vidualized basis. Yet the doctrine does not disregard the impact
of procedural requirements on legislative and administrative
programs, for even when a conclusive presumption review is ap-
propriate it does not uncompromisingly require an individ-
ualized determination. Consistent with the Goldberg approach to
due process analysis, the doctrine can accommodate valid sub-
stantive objectives by accepting reduced procedures. A survey of
the fair adjudication rulings provides many examples of pro-
cedural safeguards that have been fashioned to accommodate
valid substantive goals. As one court aptly stated, a procedural
fairness review must be sufficiently flexible to ensure program
... See text accompanying notes 217-20 supra.
25 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975).
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viability "lest we kill the goose in our solicitude for the eggs., 27 6
In Turner, the Supreme Court reintroduced the conclusive
presumption test, apparently as an adjunct to the new reason-
ableness variation of equal protection analysis. Certainly, the
identification of a special interest provides an appropriate occa-
sion for requiring legislatures and agencies to act with greater
precision. Pointing to an "unpredictable" Court2 7 7 and "ad hoc
elevation of rights and values, 278 however, critics have sug-
gested that such interests are only uncertainly safeguarded.
279
More significantly, special interest and new reasonableness prin-
ciples are unlikely to provide the desirable protection mandated
by the application of procedural principles to cases like Murry
(the food stamp eligibility case) and Mandina (the housing eligi-
bility case). For example, it is not easily demonstrable that the
eligibility criterion invalidated in Mum' is any less reasonable
than that upheld in Salfi. Also, current equal protection treat-
ment of housing and poverty issues does not offer a basis for
correcting the procedural deficiency in Mandina.28" Thus, a con-
276 Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1246 (1st Cir. 1970).
277 Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 645, 664
(1975) (remarks of Prof. Gunther).
278 Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of
Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945, 946 (1975).
279 See, e.g., Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger Court, supra note 277, at 648
(remarks of Prof. Forrester), 656-57 (remarks of Prof. Gunther); Wilkinson, supra note
278, at 950-54.
280 Although a procedural review easily mandated the fair procedures required in
Mandina, current equal protection doctrine would not so easily yield the same sensible
result. In Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), the Supreme Court rejected as un-
reasonable an Oregon statute, ORE. REV. STAT. § 105.160 (1969), that required a tenant
seeking to appeal an eviction after a forcible entry and wrongful detainer (FED) action
brought by the landlord to post a bond equal to twice the rental value of the property
from the time of commencement of the action to final judgment. 405 U.S. at 74. This
part of the Normet decision and Mandina both can be viewed as involving special poverty
and housing values. However, in an earlier portion of the Normet ruling, which rejected
an attack on Oregon's FED procedures, ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 105.135, .140, .145 (1969),
the majority opinion declared that the Constitution provides no "guarantee of access to
dwellings of a particular quality .... " 405 U.S. at 74. Although the discussion of the
double-bond requirement did speak of its "discrimination against the poor," id. at 79,
the Normet Court's primary concern apparently was that the double-bond requirement
unfairly precluded some litigants from exercising the statutorily created right to appeal.
Id. at 77-79. The Mandina facts, however, would not give rise to such a judicial interest
in preserving a fair appeals process. If a Mandina "new reasonableness" claim were to
be grounded on a poverty-oriented argument, its failure would be certain in light of the
Supreme Court's rulings in such cases as James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (197'1) and
San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). An argument invoking
both poverty and housing interests also would be unlikely to succeed. See James v. Val-
tierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). See also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974);
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. at 73-74 (discussing possible constitutional status for hous-
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clusive presumption theory that invokes procedural protections
only on behalf of judicially defined special interests would leave
intact many laws and regulations that improperly eschew a fair
degree of individualized determination.
Had the Court appreciated the analytic boundaries that con-
strain the procedural reach of the conclusive presumption doc-
trine in Salfi, it might have ordered a more individualized de-
termination. As Justice Brennan explained in dissent, objective
standards for conducting adjudicatory factfinding were dis-
cernible. 281 A requirement of fair adjudication in Salfi and other
cases like it would not involve the courts in policy judgments,
play havoc with a broad range of commonly accepted laws, or
mask substantive intervention with procedural dress. It merely
would be a judicial exercise of a peculiarly judicial function-
ensuring procedural fairness, regardless of the position of the
individual interest affected on the Court's current hierarchy of
values. In a classic formulation, it was observed that
[p]rocedural fairness, if not all that originally was meant
by due process of law, it is at least what it most uncom-
promisingly requires. Procedural due process is more
elemental and less flexible than substantive due process.
It yields less to the times, varies less with conditions, and
defers much less to legislative judgment. Insofar as it is
technical law, it must be a specialized responsibility
within the competence of the judiciary on which they do
not bend before political branches of the Government,
as they should on matters of policy which comprise sub-
stantive law.
28 2
A properly defined coriclusive presumption doctrine can help
ensure the use of fair procedures in pursuit of government's
legitimate substantive goals.
ing interests). Moreover, even if Mandina affected the same values that lead to the Court's
invalidation of the double-bond requirement in Normet, the Court still might determine
under a new reasonableness test that the rent-income ratio screening standard at issue
in Mandina more reasonably served a legitimate objective than did the Oregon double-
bond requirement.
281 422 U.S. at 804 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
282 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (Jackson &
Frankfurter, J.J., dissenting). Justice Jackson's dissent was specifically endorsed in a
separate opinion by Justices Black and Douglas. Id. at 217 (Black & Douglas, J.J., dis-
senting).
